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Because the terms 1 progresslve,• 'Progressive,~ •stalwart' 
1 conservative 1 are used throughout this manuscript, I have, fo~ 
clarity, capitalized 'Progressive• to indicate that this was the 
PI'ogressive Party, or its members; the term 'progressive• which 
snot capitalized, refers to the progressive element of the 
'Stalwart' and 1 conservative 1 are aynonomous 
for the reactionary wing of the Republican Party. 





·· Throughout the various nations of the world, reforms were 
nineteenth and early twentieth 
As the results of the Ihdustr1al Revolution, the rise 
feeling, and the demands for more democracy became 
:e evident, the ruling classes of many nations were obliged to 
', nt many reforms in Government. These reforms differed in form 
too, in the extent to which they 
.,.fe destined to alleviate the agitation of the many political 
economic groups. 
In England the demands of the middle class, and the agr1-
hi1tural and working classes too, resulted in the granting of 
~lecHOral reforms enfranchising nearly every male. Other measures 
~1so sanctioned were social, religious, educational, economic, 
'~nd, and labor reforms. England, by 1912, was virtually a de-
atoeratie nation, and well on the road to becoming what is now 
t ,··, 
1 'diser1bed in the term, "welfare state.u Within Germany, France, 
Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Balkans headway was like-
Vise being made. In Germany the spirit of nationalism, as it di'd 
in Italy, combined the various states into a strong nation. In 
granting universal manhood suffrage to its people for the election 
Of the Reichetag, Germany made an important concession.to de-
mocracy. France was fundamentally democratic after the establish-
ment of the Third Republic. Austria-Hungary, by establishing the 
Dual Monarchy, was evolving slowly toward a more liberal gavernment/, 
r 
2 
f•pecially ili0 A.ustria. Russia, though still mainly autocratic, 
\~surrendered somewhat more than a principle when she establish- 1 
I 
~he Du.ma and Zemstovs. Bf 1912, the Balkan States had establishl 
I 
parliaments, as had the strange new nation called Japan. TO 
·r .. ~eater or less degree, depending upon the lecation, the advance 
.,it democracy was accompanied by concessions in social reform. In 
;sh.ort, a characterizing feature of this period of world history 
the agitation for and the obtaining of much needed social and 
cal reform. The world was slowly becoming more democratic 
it was beginning to hear the demands of its people for 
independence and for their share of things other than toil.! 
I 
This agitation for reform was heard in the United States·. 
Regardless of the Jacksonian type of democracy which our country 
established before the Civil War, new interests had taken over 
controls of the government an~ were ruling for the people. 
fteold alliance between the agricultural West and the South had 
been broken. A new industrialism which evolved out of the Civil 
War grew to great proportions, physically and politically as well. 
Glant corporations stifled competition, fixed prices, and nearly 
controlled the wealth of the nation. The United States Senate 
became known as the "millionaires• club," and its members were 
identified as much nby the political interest they represented 
l 
&s by the state from which they came." It was the rich man's 
1 George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and~ Progressive 
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7 
it would blossom into a nationwide accomplishment. Roosevelt had 
some achievements to his credit which f'urthered the progressive 
movement, but it wasn't until his second term, beginning in 1904, 
7 
that he really helped out the progressives. Onl.y a few months 
after his election he struck out at the trusts and demanded trust 
regulation. Needless to say, the conservatives in Congress were 
not sleeping when Roosevelt put forth his proposals, but a split 
developed in their ranks and Roosevelt secured some of his legis-
lation. The split mended and little more was accomplished until 
a new Qongress was elected in 1906. The new Congress had more 
progressives in it than the old one, but they were still in the -
minority even after entering into a coalition with the Democrats. 
Their numbers were mounting, however, and the rule of such men as 
Joe Cannon in the HdUse was not to be endured for too long a 
time. Although Roosevelt did not accomplish any great progressive 
projects in the last part of his term,·he started to bring cor-
ruption and inefficiency into the open. It was through the 'trust-
busting1of Theodore Roosevelt that the attention of the whole 
nation was brought on the problem oause4 by the development of 
e 
monopolistic business organizations. He sympathized. with labor, 
a strange attitude in his day. He openly prosecuted the t1."llsts 
and. gave the nation new ideals of government for the f'uture. A 
final success was the selection of his successor to continue his .. 




Progressivism seemed destined to succeed. 
After Taft took office in 1909, he found that in succeeding 
Roosevelt as 'President he was undertaking a difficult task. It 
was not lbng before Taft, not as progressive as Roosevelt had 
thought, aligned himself with the ultra-conservatives of the 
Republican ~arty. The progressive-conservative division in the 
Republican Earty which occurred during Roosevelt's last term, 
reached over into Taft's term and the new President assumed the 
leadership of one of the factions of the split. It has been said 
9 
that this disaster was almost inevitable, that the four years 
of Taft's term heightened the turbulence of those years, and that 
10 
his la.ck of ab111 ty insured "nothing but misfortune. n 
Recounting briefly the more important events which occurred 
during President Taft's term, the Payne-Aldrich Tariff (August 
5, 1909) is the first to be considered. Pledged to tariff re-
vision, as they were in their platform, the Republicans could not 
overlook this question. Taft deemed revision important enough 
to call a special session for March 15, 1909. The Payne bill 
which was reported in the House was an honest attempt to lower 
the high protective tariff. In the Senate the story was different 
~ 
With "arch-protectionist" Nelson w. Aldrich in command of the 
" Senate, the reductions were eut out and protection was maintained 
almost unimpaired. The I insurgent I Republicans, particularly 
229. 
9 Herbert s. Duffy, William.Howard Ta.ft (New York, 1930), 
10 Mowry, 40. 
9 
of Wisconsin, Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana,' 
and Albert B. OU.mm.ins and J.P. Dolliver of Iowa, resisted the 
passage of this bill bitterly. This is often said te have been 
the first step in the down.fall of Taft's a.dm1n1stration. Because 
of the "murmurs of dissatisfaction" that arose after the tariff 
bill became iaw, Taft attempted to explain the bill and silence 
his critics. The result was d1sast~ous. At Winona, Minnesota, 
.. 
Taft admitted certain defects in the. tariff law, but he emphasized. 
11 0n the whole, however, I am bound to say that I think the Payne 
11 
bill is the best that the Republican party ever passed." The 
result of this speech was the further widening of the split in 
the Republican Party. The Progressives had little or no love for 
Taft after this. The congressional election of 1910 was to prove 
.,how seriously the president had miscalculated in publicly endors-
ing the Payne-Aldrich Act."12 
Other events took place in 1910 to alienate the progressives 
from Taft's administration. Although Taft had not reappointed 
John Garfield as Secretary of Interior when he followed Roosevelt 
into the White House, it was taken for granted that Taft favored 
the conservation of national resources policy of the Roosevelt 
administration. When Richard A. Ballinger was appointed to the 
job Garfieid vacated, a different attitude toward conservation 
was introduced. Ballinger was more lenient in allowing large 
11 Harvey Wish, Contemporary America: ~ National Scene 
Since 1900 (New York, 1945), 91. 
12Ibid. 
10 
tracts of lands to be opened for entry as well as in:1allowing 
the various interests the use of the resources of the domain. 
The change in policy· which Ballinger brought about.excited the 
progressives and caused them to make many accusations about the 
different "interests" taking over the public resources. The 
I 
comm0tion brought about by these charges, which were later declareq. 
i 
untrue by a congressional investigating committee, ca.used Taft 
to dismiss Gifford Pinchot, the chief forester, who had made 
unflattering comments about the Taft administration's policies. 
Even though the investigation cleared Ballinger of P1nchot 1 s 
charges, enough doubt was created about the integrity of Ba.llinger 
by the sk11lf'ul work of Louis A. Brandeis, the attorney repre-
senting the anti-Tgft forces, to cause the Secretary of Interior 
to resign shortly after. In this investigation the Taft adminis• 
tration·,was again embarrassed, and the President was shown not to 
be following the policies of Roosevelt. 
The Ba.llinger-Pinchot controversy adversely influenced the 
friendly relations between Roosevelt and Taft. Both Garfield and. 
Pinchot were now allied against Taft. Roosevelt was winding up 
his A:rr1can hunting trip and preparing to return home. Pinchot 
1 left America and went to the White Nile where he met Roosevelt 
and conferred with him. Taft was well aware of the fact that "all 
of' Roosevelt's followers disapproved. of him,n but he also "had 
every confidence that Roosevelt, by investigating the facts ••• , 
13 
would detect their shortsightedness and narrow partisanship." 
13nurry, 258. 
-- ------------··---·--.. --.---.--·"-----··----------·- ·--------·------------------ ------ ------- ---· .. -· .. ·------~---·--
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17 a middle of the road policy. They spurned any attempt at 
compromise. 
Meanwhile, Theodore Roosevelt returned home to a tremendous 
welcome on June 16, 1910, indicating whom the American people 
loved. Although he was non-commdttal as to where he stood, he 
stated that he was going to try to help solve the country's 
problems. Demands upon Roosevelt from both factions in-, the 
Republican Party to take their side were forthcoming regularly. 
Actually, the ex-President was in a quandary. Taft wa.s his friend; 
Roosevelt had made him President; but, as President, Ta.ft had not 
carried out Roosevelt's policies, or so the progressives insisted. 
For Roosevelt to criticize Taft would be to criticize his own 
actions. Yet, silence offered him no solution to his problem 
because his silence was being construed as approval by one group 
and disapproval by others. Flnally he spoke out at Osawatomie, 
Kansas, (Aug. 31, 1910) with his doctrine of "New Nationalism ... 
On this occas1on,he criticized the Taft administration and declared 
himself favoring government regulation of eorporations. Roosevelt 
wanted reform. He stated that social justice could never be 
attained in the nation until the power of the federal government 
was greatly increased. He stated that the judiciary must "be 
interested in human welfare rather than in property." He endorsed 
the graduated income and the inheritance tax, a comprehensive 
workingman's compensation act, laws to regulate the conditions 
and terms of child and female labor, a thorough going revision 
17 4 Sullivan, 51. 
------------·-·--------·--------·------·-·-····----------·--·-----·-·--··- ·-- - - ---------- ----------------------
13 
of the tariff, and greatly inereased supervision of the capital-
18 
1zation of all corporations engaged in interstate business. 
19 
Speaking in this manner throughout the Mid-west, Roosevelt 
al1enated himself from Taft. 
In retrospect it might be well to comment upon the degree 
of Theodore Roosevelt's leftward shift in polities. While he was 
President, Roosevelt had prided himself upon the fact that he was 
a conservative. He abhorred the "radiealism11 of La Fallette and 
he dreaded the uextreme measures" of William Jennings Bryan who 
also claimed to be a conservative. His "New Nationalism" could 
not be called rs.di cal any more than 1 t could be called conserva. ti ve! 
during this period. The important feature is, as Me:>wry says, "his 
concepts of the extent to which a powert'Ul federal government 
could regulate and use private property in the interests of the 
whole, and his declarations about labor, when viewed by the eyes 
18 Mowry,G!44; H.P. Goss, a recent writer on this period, : 
states that in;speech, Roosevelt wove his eighteen points eoncern-i 
ing business and labor into an-,oration which would later serve as i 
the principles of the progressive Jarty. In the main, he believed!· 
this t•New Nationalism" simply restated the ideas he had incorpora.t-i-
ed in his message to congress on January 31, 1908. "Pre-Convention 
Presidential Campaign of 1912n (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Univer- 1 
sity of California, Berkeley, 1912), 100. · 
Henry F. Pringle calls this speech the most important and 
the most disastrous of Roosevelt's career. Tl'leodore Roosevelt, 
A Biography (New York, 1931), 542. 
19 During this tour Roosevelt visited Fargo on Labor Day, 
September 5, 1910. He gave two speeches upon labor problems and 
conditions to an estimated audience of 30,000 people. He also 
:iadd the cornerstone of the Carnegie Library of Fargo College. 
Present with him and also speaking were Pres1·dent Creegan of Fargo 
College, Congressman L. Bo Hanna, and Governor John Burke. Grand 
Forks Herald, Sept. 6, 1910. 
14 
of 19101 ,were nothing short of revolutionary. Even Roosevelt 
himself was alarmed by the storm his speech caused. "He protested 
that he had merely been quoting Lincoln. He admitted that it had 
been a 1blunder of some gravity' to 'take that position in the 
21 22 
fashion that I did!" Many writers agree that the "New Nation-
alism" was composed of many of the ideas set forth by Herbert 
Croly in his book The Promise of American !A!:!• This new dogma 
got Ro.osevelt the support of many western "radicals, n support 
which he did not necessarily want. Through gaining the support 
of the moderate progressives and. the moderate regulars, Roosevelt 
had hoped he could save the party and re-unite it as it was a few 
years be:f'ore. W.t bis ••radical" speeches sea.red the conservatives, 
and his backtracking pronouncements slighted the progressives. 
Shortly before the Osawatomie speech and directly :f'ollowing 
it, other factors joined to widen the split which was becoming 
1 apparent between Tlieodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. It 
should be remembered that as yet Roosevelt had not openly attacked 
Taft's ad.ministration or the President himself; he had merely 
criticized the administration. However, the activities of the 
two men in the election of 1910 further embittered them towards 
each other. Because of a promise made to Governor Charles Evans 
Hughes of New Yerk, Roosevelt on July 29, agreed to support the 
20 4 Mowry, 1·4. 
21 Pringle, Taft, II, 572; Roosevelt, 543. 
22 Ibid., 569l Mowry, 146; and Goss, 111. 
direct primary bill then up,~for passage in the state legislature. i 
One writer states that this is the beginning of a series of 
events that grew until we had three candidates dividing the votes 
23 
1:n.~·-1912. The primary bill was defeated, but this brought re-
newed activity by Roosevelt an the political stage of New York. 
He announced himself a candidate for the temporary chairmanship 
of the Republican Barty in that state, and only after a bitter 
and lang struggle against the Taft forees of the state did he 
finally get himself elec~ed. Ironically, the ex-President found 
himself supporting a Taft ma.n for the governorship of New York. 
Primarily, though, Roosevelt's policy was that of conciliation 
between the two estranged elements of the Republican _Jta.rty. He 
tried to find some middle ground between the two elements upon 
which he might stand and succeed in his task. His middle of 
the road policy in New York failed to unite the Republican 
elements there, and in the election his candidates were beaten, 
as were all but two for whom he had spoken in the other states 
24 
he had visited. 
Also in 1910, the Canadian Reciprocity measure was introduc-
ed in Congress. Al though it was finally passed through both 
houses at another session, it was opposed by factions of both the 
progressive and the stalwart Republicans. Of all the adminis-
tration's proposals, this policy of reciprocity perhaps alienated 
23 Owen Wister, Roosevelt: The Story 2!, !. Friendship {New 
York, 1930), 282. 
24 1: -Mowry, 15e. 
--·---·--------~------~ -- ------- -~- - ~ --- ------
16 
more votes than any other. The middle-western farmer was furious 
because Canadian grain would compete w1th the American products; 
it was the same sort of view common ~o other protected interests, 
such as the paper interests, the lumber interests, and even the 
25 
fishing interests. It took the Democrats working 1n conjunction 
with a number of Republicans to make it law. Their work was to 
come to nothing because the treaty was defeated (1911) in the [ 
Canadian parliament which did not wish Canada to become an economic! 
colony of the United States. At first Roosevelt thought that 
Taft's proposal was "admirable from every standpo1nt,n but later 
onJ.he changed his mind about reciprocity. By July of 1910, he 
felt th.at the bill had been nvery badly drawnu and th.at it was 
designed to proteet the much-protected manufacturer and sacrifice 
26 
the farmer. 
Of all the causes of the split between Roosevelt and Taft, 
Roosevelt's friend, Mark Sullivan, states that the primary cause 
was the Taft .fldmin1stratien1 s suit against the United States 
Steel Corporation on the charge it was a monopoly.27 During 
Roosevelt's tenure as President, the Colonel allowed the steel 
corporation to buy up the Tennessee Coal and Iron company's stock 
which increased the corporation's size and power. When Rooseveil.t 
25 Mowry, 162. 
26 ~., 160. 
27 Sullivan, IV, 462-3. 
! 
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17 
permitted this purchase, a panic was in progress on the stock 
market.· Roosevelt was persuaded by J.P. Morgan that the pur-
ehase of the Tennessee Company would give new oo~idence to the 
nation and that thus an economic collapse would be averted. Al-
though Taft was a member of Roosevelt's cabinet at this time, 
he did not, according to Roosevelt, protest against this action, 
28 
nor did he openly approve of it. It was, therefore, a personal 
blow to Roosevelt when his actions while President were made to 
look as if he had been duped by the Steel magnates. Coming 
from the man he had put in the Presidential chair, this personal 
affront provoked Roosevelt who believed that big business 
organizations were not a crime, an.a that "nothing ••• is gained by 
breaking up a huge inter-state ••• organization whicg has ;c.gt 
f ,,:2~ of ended ttJ.l~rwigf tha;n,bI.•ii§.~•*j• 
The objective which Taft bad in mind when he started his 
thorough prosecution of big business may have been to follow 
through Roosevelt's 'trust-busting' policy. Still there was 
more to it than that. The Democrats ware charging that the 
President was too friendly to the trusts, a....~d the progressives 
were always clamoring for the breakup or regulation of the 
trusts. Considering the failures which Taft had experienced 
in attempting to appease or disarm his critics, it is not strange 
that he embarked on his •trust-busting 1 program. .uiother reason 
28 Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography (New York, 1919), 
606. 
29 ~-, 616. 
18 
for Taft's program would be his lawyer's conviction that the law, 
being on the statute books, should be enforced. Nevertheless, 
this steel corporation suit, whether actually designed to reflect 
on Roosevelt's ad.ministration or net, failed to achieve its geal 
of breaking up the huge corporation; it did, however, succeed 
in further breaking up the Republican ~arty. 
Meanwhile the progressives were not sleeping. Sena.tor 
Robert M. La Follette and others, awake to the discontent with 
Taft felt by many, organized the National Progressive Republican 
League on January 21, 1911. It was another step toward the break 
in the Republican tarty. The League grew rapidly. The leading 
progressives of the country supported it, and it looked as if 
.. Battle-Bob" La Follette was going to be its unanimous choice 
as a presidential candidate. Yet it lacked a very important 
element--Roosevelt. In the League were many out-e.nd-out Roosevelt( 
men sueh as Amos and Gifford Pinehot, James R. Garfield, William 
Flinn, and Medill McCormick, but they appear to have been only 
waiting to see what Roosevelt was going to do. According to 
Claude G. Bowers, from the very beginning or his candidaey, 
La Follette•s strength was "sapped and mined by counterfeit 
30 
supporters seeking to persuade the Rough Rider to mount again." 
Sullivan states that to most progressives hatred and the wish 
to do damage to the President seemed to be the primary reasons 
30 Olaude G. Bowers, Beveridge and!:!!!, Progressive Era 
(New York, 1932), 416. 
' 
tor the insurgent's flocking to the La Follette standard and 
31 
into the league. 
19 
Since his arrival home from Europe in 1910, Roosevelt had 
been-asked numerous times whether he favored or opposed President 
Taft's renomination, and whether or noi he would seek the Republic-
an nomination in 1912. For over a year and a half Roosevelt 
failed to commit himself one way or the ether. BY the end. of 
1911, the Colonel was conVinced that if Taft were renominated the 
Democrats would win the election of' 1912. He was assured by his 
admirers that La Follette did not have a eh.a.nee to win. Being a 
Republican, Roosevelt could imagine nothing more dangerous to the 
welfare of his country than a Democrat in the White House. Un-
doubtedly he must have felt it was he alone that would be able to 
save his party from within and without, and that it was he alone 
who could save his country from the choa.s sure to come if' a 
32 
Democrat was elected. As time went by, the Roosevelt supporters 
thought that more and more people were becoming disgruntled with 
Taft and La Follette, and were calling for Roosevelt to take a 
stand. The Stalwarts, for example, in North Dakota were beginning 
a 'draft-Roosevelt' movement. Finally it became a question of 
whether Roosevelt should run for the nomination in 1912 or in 1916. 
In other words, should he allow Ta.ft to take a licking in 1912, or 
31 Sullivan, 372-3. 
32 Mowry, 175-8 • 
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should he try to save the Republican Party from being beaten 
then. When Mark Sullivan told him the old adage nthe time to 
set a hen is when the hen wants to set" on January 20, 1912, 
Roosevelt took this bit of barnyard advice and changed it to mean 
"the time to run 1s when the people want you to run. n?iS 
After Senator La Follette's poor speeeh in Philadelphia on 
February 2, 1912, a mass exodus of his supporters resulted. Many 
of his backers, by doing some wishful thinking that the man from 
Wisconsin was unable to carry on with his candidacy, turned to 
Roosevelt. La. Follette's alleged collapse while speaking was 
greatly publicized by his opponents, and it was used later as an 
explanation by Roosevelt in justifying his candidacy as a pro-
gressive for the Republican nomination. It was said to be one of 
the main reasons which made Roosevelt decide to "throw his hat 
in the ring." Both before and after La Follette-'s unfortunate 
speech, in which he berated the very people who had invited him, 
some conservative newspapers in North Dakota were saying that 
there was scarcely a ehanee of La Fol1ette's ever securing the 
nomination at the Republican convention. These North Dakota 
papers advocated the nomination and support of Roosevelt, follow-
ing the lead of such progressive papers as William Allen White's 
34 
Emporia (Kansas) Gazette, and the Chicago Tribune. Progressive 
leaders throughout the country were appealing for Roosevelt to 
run. Finally, eight days after La Follette's speech, the 
33 Sullivan, 471. 
34 Grand Forks Daily Herald, Jan. 18, 1912; McVille Journal 
Feb. ·22, 1912. 
' Republican governors of seven states, following the instructions 
which Roosevelt had given them to make their actions appear to 
come from popular demand, wrote the Colonel asking him to run 
against Tart for the nomination. 35 Because this request eame 
so soon after La. Follette's speech, one might suspect its genuine-
ness. The governors wrote that it was his duty to the American 
1 people who had been thwarted by the administration. The country 
waited for his reply. 
It was not long in coming. At Columbus, Ohio, on February 
21, Roosevelt attacked Taft's administration and set forth his 
convictions on the leading public issues. He called these beliefs 
nThe Charter of Democracy." Roosevelt adhered to the principles 
he set forth at Osawatomie, but he qualified them. He made so 
many assurances to the business world that he might have won over 
a great portion of conservative Republicans if he had not included 
such devices as the initiative and referendum on legislation, and 
36 the recall of Judicial decisions. Mowry writes that because 
Roosevelt was aware of the nation's social unbalance, the Colonel 
"sincerely believed that comprehensive legislative corrections 
should, and in fact, must be made quiekly.n Roosevelt, then, was 
interested in steering the country down a middle of the road path 
which alienated many progressives as well as conservatives from 
supporting him. In that respect 1 t has been called oBB of 0 the 
35 Henry F. Pringle, Roosevelt, 555. 
36 Ibid., 558; Mowry, 212-3. 
22 
meat disastrous of all Roosevelt's public addresses."37 On his 
way home from this speaking engagement, Roosevelt in answering 
queries stated, "My hat is in the ring." Two days later he 
I 
answered the seven governors, saying, "I will accept the nominationi 
for President if it is tendered to me, and I will adhere to this 
decision until the convention has expressed its preference."38 
From here on this monograph will attempt to show the effects 
of national politics and the party nominations upon the political 
scene within the state of North Dakota. Being a traditionally 
strong Republican state, North Dakota was-certain to feel the 
effects on its political thinking by a split in the Grand Old 
Party. With the passage of the general primary law in 1906, and 
the presidential preferential primary law in 1911, North Dakota 
had placed itself beside the more progressive states in the nation, 
and its citizens were assured of the final voice in the electora.r. 
contest of 1912. This final voice was needed as the events began 
to unf'old. During this period, the~, the dire et primary played 
an important part in the political history of this state. Another 
important consideration to be kept 1n mind 1n this electoral 
battle is that Roosevelt lived a part of his life in North Dakota 
and the state had more or less adopted him as a son. The people 
of North Dakota attributed much of Roosevelt's success to the 
hearty life he had experieneed while living in their state. 
37 Mowry, 212. 
38 Sullivan, 4771 Pringle, Roosevelt, 556; Mowry, 218. 
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CHPA TER J:I, 
PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENTIAL PRIMA.RY IN NORTH DAKOTA 
Before 1906, a number of Republicans in North Dakota, having 
grown weary of the dominant Republican rule of the political 
machine of Alexander McKenzie, began to break away from its 
dictation and to do some private thinking which laid the foundation: 
for independent action. The group, much like the insurgents of 
neighboring states, was small at first, but it constantly grew 
in number until it no longer could be ignored in the political 
affairs of the state. In time it developed into the progressive 
wing of the Republican farty with enough strength to classify 
?forth Dakota as one of the leading progressive states in the 
country. 
Meanwhile the McKenzie element of the Republican ~arty was 
not dead by any means. By 1912, the members of this faction 
were still in the majority and they controlled the party machin~y. 
It was this group that made up the "regular" element of the 
.. 
Republican farty in North Dakota. Between the regulars and the 
progre•sives the struggle for the political control of the Re-
publican state of North Daketa was centered. Both factions put 
up their own candidates for the various state offices in each 
state primary election after 1906. In-a truly Republican,··state, 
as North Dakota was supposed to be, nomination was looked upon 
as the equivalent to election to office. 
Events did not prove the logic that nomination was equivalent 
---- ------------- ----~----··-------
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te election, however, for intra-party politics had several times 
surrendred the political control of the state to the Democrats, 
the minority party. Primarily because of the split in the Re-
publican rarty, John Burke, the Democratic candidate for governor, 
was elected three times: 1906, 1908, and 1910. Burke was from 
Devils Lake, and before his election to the governorship he had 
served in the North Dakota legislature both as a representative 
and a senator. When the re~ular Republicans renominated Governor 
E. Y. Sarles, in 1906, the progressives voted with the Democrats 
to elect Burke. The direct primary law of 1906, used the first 
time in the election of 1908, failed to solidify the Republican 
voting strength. The result was quite the opposite. The regular 
candidate, c. A. Johnson, beat the progressive candidate, Tread-. 
well Twichell, for the Republican nomination in·June of 1908, but 
in -wovember the progressives voted almost solidly with the 
Democrats and re-elected Burke as governor. In 1910 Johnson beat 
James Buchanan, the progressive nominee, in the June primaries 
only to be beaten again in the fall by the progressive-Democrat 
vote which elected Burke to his third term. 
Yet the progressive voters in North Dakota remained largely 
Republicans. They believed that the Republican ~arty showed, 
more than the Democratic !)arty, indications of becoming a pro-
gressive party. The free trade policies of the Democrats held 
little attraction to the citizens of the state, who were afraid 
of the competition of world grain markets. Important as these 
' 
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beliefs were, "when it became a question of electing e.n organiza-
tion Republican or a Democrat who showed signs of progressive 
1 
tendencies, they chose the Democrat." Their independence of the 
Republican Party is shown, therefore, in their supporting a man 
of the opposing party because they believed him to be more pro-
gressive than their own candidate. However, the progressives 
only supported the Democratic eand.1dates on the state level; they 
did not go outside their party 1n the national elections. William 
Howard Taft, the Republican presidential candidate in 1908, re-
ceived 57,680 votes to the 32,885 votes for William J. Bryan, his 
2 
Democratic opponent. Indeed, the progressives went so far as to 
refuse frequently to abide by the results of their own legislation 
--the direct primary law. 
The progressive element in North Dakota was unpredictable 
' when the year of 1912 came around. Because the state abounded 
' w1 th true progress! ve sentiment, it was believed to be wholly in 
La Follette's camp. Bt:li when the talk of Roosevelt as a candidate 
began, some doubt began to creep in. By the beginning of 1912, 
there was much speculation ae to which of the two would get the 
delegates to thellipublican National convention at Chicago in June. 
That North Dakota favored La Follette for the cand1daey of the 
Republican Party was conceded by the conservative Grand Forks 
Herald: 11 !:f' the decision rested with the Hllpub11can voters of 
1 Fargo murier-li!!.!, Sept. 21, 1912. 
2 State£!_ North Dakota 1913 Legislative Manual, (Devils 
Lake, 1913), 221. 
' 
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North Dakota, as the situation stands now, he would undoubtedly 
be the nominee 'ot the party at the coming convention •••• " Al-
though the Herald was reluctant to predict that this situation 
was going to continue, it declared that in the absence of any 
other worthy candidate a person would be a fool to try to make a 
fight against La FOi,lette in North Dakota.3 But a third candidate 
might change the whole picture, and anxious eyes and ea.rs in 
North Dakota were watching and listening for Roosevelt, for whom 
sentiment was espeeially strong in the Grand Forks area of North 
Dakota. The Grand Forks Herald was openly behind a "we want 
Roosevelttt movement. THe paper stated that there was a "very 
real and earnest desire on the part of a very large number of 
people that Roosevelt again become the standard bearer of the 
party." Furthermore, it said that there was hardly a chance of' 
La Fellette's nomination, therefore, the supporters of La Follette 
should advocate him to the best of their ability without hurting 
4 
the other man who might ultimately get the nomination. 
Meanwhile the progressives made the first real move. When 
La F~llette announced hie candidacy for the presidency in 1911, 
Senator Gronna of North Dakota threw the support of the North 
Dakota state progressive organization behind him. Tl'i1s procedure 
was duplicated by the many local progressive clubs throughout 
the state during the rest of' 1911. It is significant to note that 
3 Grand Forks Daily Herald, Jan. 3 and 5, 1912; herea~t•~ 
cited as the Grand Forks Herald. 
4 Grand Forks Herald Jan. 3, 1912. 
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the progressives were organized locally before there had been a 
national organization. Gronna was among those who s1gned the 
declaration of principles when the National Progressive Republican 
League was formed on:1_Ja.nuary 21, 1911. Moreover, at the first 
ammal meeting of the North Dakota Progressive Republican League, 
the progressives laid plans for their 1912 campaign and elected 
officers for the next year: 
President--R. M. Pollock of Fargo 
First Vice-President--Everett J. Conrad of Mal.ndan 
Second Vice-President--P. Thors0n of Grand Forks 
Secretary--S1d.ney Adams of Fargo5 
Also at this meeting candidates for different positions were en-
dorsed, new candidates were selected, a list for the ,National con-
vention and electoral college was chosen, and resolutions were 
adopted. Robert M. La Follette was endorsed as its Presidential 
nominee, James A. Buchanan of Buchana.nnas its nominee for Governor,[ 
and Thomas Marshall from Oakes to succeed James Kennedy of Fargo 
as National Committeeman. P. D. Norton was selected as the candi-
date for Congress in the third district. The rest of the Republic-[ 
an incumbents and candidates were primarily progressives, and they 
were endorsed. In the resolutions, tribute was paid to Theodore 
Roosevelt, but not by name. He was praised "as a friend of the 
people 11 , but it was La Follette who was praised as the leader of 
6 
the progressive movement. 
5 Grand Forks Herald, Jan. 17, 1912. 
6 Rugby Optimist, Jan. 19, 1912. 
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Only six days later, January 22, J. w. Scott of Gilby wrote 
a letter to the editor of the Grand Forks Herald urging that a 
convention should be held for all those who favored the election 
of Roosevelt delegates in the presidential primary coming up in 
March. Scott believed tha.t the Republicans should unite on 
Roosevelt if they wanted yictory in the election. The man from 
Gilby deno1,1nced the action of the progressive Republicans in their 
gathering at Fargo, and he stated that he was for La Follette but 
that he knew that h1s election would be an 1mpossibility.7 Need-
less to say, the Herald backed this move earnestly in its columns. 
Replies to the motion that a convention be held for Roosevelt 
backers were not long in coming. According to the Herald, many 
hailed the call for a convention with enthusiasm. In a letter to 
the Herald, Siter Serumgard of Devils Lake, for many years a lead- I 
ing Democrat of North Dakota, came out favoring the Colonel. 
Finally, responding to the many seconds to his motion for a con-
I 
vention, Seott, in another letter to the Grand For.ks Herald, moved I 
! 
that the convention be held in Grand. Forks on February 20, and 
invited all in favor, regardless of party affiliations, to come 
8 to the meeting. 
Although a strong current of pro-Roosevelt feeling was de- , 
velop1ng 1n North Dakota, Roosevelt h1mse11' had made no overt I 
meves to signify that he was a candidate. By January 25, petitions 
7 Grand Forks Herald, Jan.. 23, 1912. 
8 ~., Feb. 1, 1912. 
---------------------------- - -------------------------'---
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to put Roosevelt's name on the presidential preferential primary 
ballot were already being circulated in Mandan and in western 
North Dakota, the region where Roosevelt had lived during his 
ranching days. By January 31, petitions were being signed in 
Valley City, and by February 17, Roosevelt's name was leading all 
9 
others on the petitions filed at Bismarck. All this had occurred 
before the proposed Roosevelt convention in Grand Forks. It was 
the purpose, then, of the Grand Forks convention to select a set 
of delegates and electors to be put under Roosevelt's name on the 
primary ballot, and to be pledged to him at the Republican National 
! 
i 
convention at Chicago. Furthermore it was felt by the Grand Forks' 
Herald that if enough voters insisted upon the nomination of 
Roosevelt, the Colonel, after being sure that it was their will 
uthat he f_iaiJ the most available man at this juncture, /}iouly 
10 
accept." The significance of the Grand Forks Roosevelt convention i 
i 
was heightened when a telegram from the National Roosevelt Committ~ 
i 
was received and published in the Grand Forks Herald on February 
16., Tltis communication stated that the committee looks to the 
Grand Forks convention "for such an endorsement of the movement •• 
• as shall se:t the nation aflame for the intrepid leader." Hoping 
that every Roosevelt Republican in North Dakota would lend his 
presence and enthusiasm to the convention,, the committee did net 
believe that "North Dakota, among the first to unfurl the Roosevelt! 
! 
9 Williston Graphic, Feb. 22, 1912. 
lO Grand Forks Herald, Feb., 1, 1912. 
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that he saw in the Roosevelt movement a chance to t>r1ng back to-
gether both factions of the Republican Barty and once again gain 
partyJsolidarity. 
But at the same time the progressive element in Borth Dakota 
were objecting to the proposed Roosevelt convention. Freel J. 
I 
Traynor of Devils Lake wrote to the Grand Forks Herald that Scott's 
mQtion for a convention "is nothing more than::a Stalwart move to 
split the progressive vote in the presidential primaries between 
La Follette and Roosevelt and thereby insure the election of a 
14 
Taft delegation to the Republican National Convention." The 
M~not Daily Reporter, a progressive newspaper, complained that the i 
,. 
' Roosevelt campaign, as 1 t was being conducted, was run by nre-
I 
actionary politicians ••• who are seeking to force down the throa~s 
of voters the allegation that Roosevelt is the progressive Re-
publican candidate for president." It was charged that the "old 
line" Republicans,,by appropriating the use of the words "pro-
g_ressive Republican", were attempting to ally themselves 11w1th 
the progressive movement in their localities ••• and seek to 
f'ool the public by the use of the na.me.n15 It is significant that 
the backers of Roosevelt in North Dakota in this phase of the 
election were members of the stalwart f'aet1on of the Republican 
iP:arly, and that any support given to the Roosevelt movement at 
l4 Grand Forks Herald, Jan. 26, 1912. 
15 Minat Daily Reporter, Feb. 19, 1912. 
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this stage would be contrary to the interests of the progressives 
16 
of the state. 
That the progressives were not delighted with the propesed 
convention was plain to see, but they were even less delighted 
with the stalwart gubei'na.torial candidate's support of Roosevelt. 
Officially, however, the North Dakota progressives were not talk-
ing. A meeting of the executive committee of the North Dakota 
Progressive Republican League was held in Fargo on February 1, and 
after the meeting the members refused to talk of the situation. 
They did however reiterate their stand which endorsed Roosevelt 
as a "splendid representative of progressivismn ·but pledged support! 
to La Follette in his campaign for president. It was made quite 
clear, moreover, that the progressive• had nothing to do with the 
17 
Roosevelt movement in North Dakota. Asle J. Gronna, United States 
I 
Senator from North Dakota, long a leading progressive 1n the state,I 
and ane of the first to endorse La Follette'e candidacy when it i I 
1l.8 
was announced in 1911, refused to bu.dge from his original position.I 
I 
Another leading progressive, Congressman H. T. Helgesen, also 
declared himself for La Fdllette regardless of wha:t Roosevelt 
might do. After Congressman L. B. Hanna came out for Roosevelt, 
the progressive papers den@unced him more than ever. One paper 
called him an "opportunist" and stated that the only reason that 
16 Mowry, 230-1. 
17 Grand Forks Herald, Feb. 2, 1912. 
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First Distriet--Dr. c. c. Creegan, Fargo; Henry Ha.le, Devils 
Lake; John H. Worst, Fargo. 
Second District--A. M. Christianson, Towner; Torger Sinnes, 
Minnewaukan; L. P. Hyde, Valley City. 
Third District--H. J. Linde, Stanley; Nicholas Hayes, Williston; 
Alfred White, Dickinson. 
Delegate at Large--J. w. Scott, Gilby. 
22 
National Committeeman--A. M. Christianson. 
Among the resolutions drawn up by the convention, two show•d 
the attitude of the meeting upon the questions which were upper-
most in the minds of most North Dakota voters. One resolution 
stated that the Canadian reciprocity pact must be repealed be-
cause if "embodied free trade for agricultural products,u while 
at the same time it sustained" excessive duties on manufactured 
articles." Tl'lis resolution further stated that the Republican 
Party should nsustain its principles and give moderate protection 
to all deserving industry."23 Yet, a second. resolution was adopted, 
possibly to show the real temper of the convention, and also to 
quiet the charge that this was a stalwart move to usurp progressive 
strength. The resolution said 11lfe af'f'-irm our sincere belier in the 
advanced Progressive Republican policies, as or1$inated by Theodore 
Roosevelt, and as championed by men like La Follette, Hughes, 
22 Later Dr. c., c. Creegan and John ·H. Worst, presidents or . 
Fargo College and the North Dakota Agricultural College respectiveli\, 
withdrew their names--perhaps because of some pressure. Fo w. Mashek 
and Smith Stimmel were selected to succeed them. Fargo Forum, Feb.' 
21, 1912; State or North Dakota 1913 Legislative Manual, 243-5. 
23 Grand Forks Herald, Feb. 21, 1912. 
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24 CU.mmins, and others." Whether or not the convention was going 
to work for the progressive principles or agree with them and 
allow them to remain unused was not st.ated. To mention them, 
though, was necessary to eat.ch additional and needed support. 
Of course, the battle between the two Republican factions 
was already well underway before the Grand Forks convention met. 
Four days before it convened~ the progressives bad announced that 
a "whirlwind" campaign in North Dakota to carry the state for 
Robert M. La Follette would be started on February 20, the same 
day of the Roosevelt convention. Many progressive orators were 
to be poured into the state to speak in La Follette 1 s behalf, 
among them such men as Senator Moses E~ Clapp -Of Minnesota, Louis 
D. Brandeis, Senator Mi.lee Poindexter of Washington, James A. 
Manahan, and Professor o. E. Merriam of Chicago. Already Walter 
L. Hauser, La Fol1ette's secretary and campaign manager, was in 
the state conferring with the state's progressives and arranging 
dates for the speakers. It was said that Roosevelt would pe I 
I 
I 
"grilled from the word go as a traitor to La Fel1ette in the North: 
25 I 
Dakota campaign. 11 As it turned out, however, beeause the demands 
were great in their own states, many of the well-known speakers 
:f'or both factions of the RepUblican Jarty could not fulfill their 
speaking dates in North Dakota. Substitutes were obtained, but 
they were not of the calibre of the men that were originally 
26 
expected. 
24 Grand Forks Herald, Feb. 21, 1912. 
25 Ibid., Feb. 17, 1912. 
26 
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Itmust be remembered.that although the primary election was 
highlight of all the state news stories, the three-cornered 
contest was duplicated in many other states. However, North 
Dakota's was to be the first of the lot, and for that matter, the 
first presidential preferential primary ever held in the United 
27 
States. Consequently, because of the great interest outside the 
state, North Dakota had for the time become the battleground of 
the factions. The Roosevelt managers, as wel1 as the La Follette 
supporters, wanted the prestige of victory in the first state 
campaign to be fought at the polls, even though enly ten delegates 
were involved. It was pointed out that if the state went for 
Roosevelt, it would be taken as an indication of strong popular 
Roosevelt sentiment which would influence the vote in other and 
larger states. While on the other hand it was said that if the 
state went for La Follette, the Taft managers would point to that 
result with pride, and would assure their people "that it /Ji.ag/ 
been demonstrated that the much vaunted sentiment for Roosevelt. 
28 
exist.Ls/ largely in the imma.gination of the promoters.i1 The 
Fargo Forum said: "North Dakota. 1s the bloody angle of the 
primary battle and its prominence at this time is out of all prop.{-
! 
i 
tion to the numerical strength of its delegat1on--beeause of the 
moral effect the success of a candidate here may have in other 
27 Although the state of Oregon passed (1910) a presidential 
primary law one year before North Dakota's, North Dakota held her 
election earlier in the spring making herself the first state in 
the Union to hold a presidential primary. 
28 Grand Forks Herald, March 10, 1912. 
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majority of votes and win the North Dakota delegation to the 
Chicago convention. The progressive viewpoint was different, how-I 
: 
ever. Senator Gronna stated 11 I am for La Follette and North Dakoti 
is for La Follette, 11 and Congressman H. T. Helgesen, another pro- 1~ 
gressive, reiterated, "I am for La Follette as long as he is a 
ea.nd1date.n32 
Such was the picture when the Roosevelt campaign got into 
full swing with the arrival of Gifford Pinchot in the state. The 
ex-•h1ef forester, who together with many other progressives had 
deserted La Follette for Roosevelt, arrived on March 4 in Valley 
City, considered a stronghold ,for La Fellette sentiment, to begin 
a series of speeches that would take h1m through the state. The 
burden of Pinchot's speeches was that Theodore Roosevelt was a 
progressive. "Before his time ,!Roosevelt'.§7 there was net pro-
gressive movement. His great fight for the plain people against 
33 
the trust and special interests awaken [si!!f the whole nation.u 
Re sought also to refute the Colonel's critics on other counts. 
At Velva and at Jamestown, Pinchot declared that Roosevelt stood 
for human rights rather than property rights, and that his "work 
in favor of the conservation of national resources should commend 
34 
him to the people. 11 He further stated that Roosevelt was a real 
progressive at heart, adding that the Colonel beeame a candidate 
32 Grand Forks Herald, Feb. 27, 1912. 
33 Fargo Forum, March 5, 1912. 
34 Ibid. 
40 
"after being urged by praet1cally all the leaders of the pro-
gressive movement and that he was the one man in the nation who 
35 could carry out the republican progressive 1deas." At Minot he 
emphasized that although Roosevelt had stated that he did not 
want to be a candidate, the Rough Rider had become one only be- I 
cause of the demand of the people and not by his own will. Answer-+ 
I 
ing the criticism that Roosevelt was not grateful to Taft, Pinchotl 
I stated that the Colonel owed nothing to Taft, while the latter : 
36 i 
owed a large part of his political career to Theodore Roosevelt. i 
Ending his major speaking engagements in North Dakota at an 
enthusiastic, well attended meeting in Grand Forks, Pinchot was 
introduced to the audience by Professor Vernon P. Squires, head 
of the English department at the state university. After Pinchot i 
began speaking, every mention of the name of Rooeevelt--and, 
disconcertingly, of La Follette--brought instant and prolonged 
applause. While urging the voters of North Dakota not to waste 
their votes on La Follette who could not be nominated, Pi~chot 
declared that Taft had deserted Roosevelt's policies and that "the 
President himself presented one of the most 'melancholy failures' 
to be found anywhere in American his,ory."37 To make his speech 
a. little more "homey," Pinchot said,".! am doubly glad to visit 
North Dakota, for Theodore Roosevelt has said more than once in 
35 Fargo Forum, March 5, 1912. 
36 Minet Daily Reporter, March 6, 1912. 
37 Grand Forks Herald, March 7, 1912. 
' 
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my hearing that it was his early training on the prairies of 
western North .Dakota that gave him an unders.tanding of what the 
plain people of this country were." Finally Pinehot reViewed the 
measures which Roosevelt had inaugurated for these plain people. 
Such measures as food inspection, pure food laws, labor settlement, 
labor recognition, and conservation of national resources were 
38 
discussed as typical Rooseveltian policies. 
With the coming of P1nehot to North Dakota, the campaign for 
Roosevelt was officially begun. On March 5, Frank Knox, the manag-
er of the Chicago headquarters of the Roosevelt campaign, hurriedly 
I 
visited North Dakota as the representative of the Roosevelt Nationai 
Com.mi ttee. The purpose or his vi s1 t was to familiarize himself:<wi t41 
the situation in the state, and to arrange for the sending to North: 
of 
DakotaAa competent man to take charge of the Roosevelt headquarters! 
of the state and to remain here until the primary election was overl 
'fi'o pro-Roosevelt newspapers interpeted this move as recognition 
of the critical iroportance of carrying the state, and the emphasis 
39 
put upon it by the Roosevelt National Committee. On the other 
hand, there were some hints that the Roosevelt campaign was not 
taking fire as had been expected. In any case, plans were made to 
" bring in many new men to speak 1n Roosevelt's behalf, and Governor 
Chester H. Aldrich of Nebraska, Henry J. Allen of Kansas, and Judge 
William D. Gordan, former speaker of the Michigan legislature, were 
38 Grand Forks Herald, March 7, 1912. 




expected to stump the state for him. On March 11, John F. Bass 
arrived in Fargo, and took charge of the Roosevelt cs.mpaign. Bass 
was a well known newspaper correspondent and a brother of the 
governor of New Hampshire. The importance put on the North Dakota 
contest is plain in the interest and emphasis that was being place~ 
I on:it by the National Roosevelt lommittee. Bass, upon his arriva.11 
. I 
at Fargo, declared Roosevelt was now recognized as the National 
progressive leader, and "any attempt to befog the issues by mixing 
the state situation with the national struggle is a blow at pro-
. . 40 
gressive organization wi-thin the national republican party." 
Perhaps Basa could see the strange alliance of the stalwarts and 
pro-Roosevelt men which had evolved in North Dakota and was seek-
ing progressive support in spite of it. 
Accompanying Bass to North Dakota had been James Rudolph 
Garfield, Roosevelt's. Secretary of Interior, who went to the 
western part of the state to campaign. While speaking at Bismarck~ 
I 
Garfield stated that he believed the direet primary would insure 
Roosevelt 1 s election in North Dakota. 
I 
He declared that if all the/ 
i 
states had the direct election, there would be no doubt a.a to who i 
! 
would win. In such states as Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, Garfiel~ 
i predicted victory regardless of the means used to eleet the dele-
gatee and stated that Roosevelt would carry those states with a 
majority between two and five to one. 41 
40 Fargo F.orum 1 March 11, 1912. 
41 
Grand Forks Herald, March 12, 1912. 
43 
More 0pt1m1sm was heard from the Roosevelt camp. On March 13 
Henry J. Allen, who was often called the 11 B1a.1ne of Kansas" be-
canse of his abilities as an orator, and the editor of the Wichita. 
Beacon through which he had been one of the leaders of the pro-
gressive cause in his home state, told his Grand Forks audience 
that he believed W~rth Dakota was in the 'Roosevelt bag'. Allen 
said, "North Dakota's ten electoral votes will not be a drop in 
the bucket when the Chica.go· convention comes. But North Dakota's 
stand ••• will have the force of a hundred delegates if the 
choice of that vote is Theodore Roosevelt •••• " Warningly, 
Allen concluded that "votes for La Follette are votes for Ta.ft. 1142 
At the same time, in Chicago, the National Roosevelt Committee 
issued a statement which claimed not only North Dakota and Minn-
esota as certain for Roosevelt, but also progressive Missouri as 
well. Frank Knox, having just returned from the two northern 
I 
states, declared as would be expected of the manager of a candidate!: 
••• In North Dakota the sentiment for Taft is negli-
gible. The only contest there is among the progressives, 
as to determine whether the delegation shall be for Roose-
velt or La Follette. Roosevelt is going to sweep the 
state. An important point in his favor is that he lived 
there for six years, and that North Dakota regards him 
for all practical purposes as a "native son."43 
On the other hand the progressives, too, were carrying on an 
extensive campaign for La Follette. Speakers from outside the 
1 state began to arrive in North Dakota as early as February 21, and 
42 Grand Forks Herald, March 14, 1912. 
43 Rugby Pptimist, March 15, 1912. 
44 
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I 
the Rough Rider in his campaign a 1kiss of death' to Roosevelt's 
i 
chanees in this state. Therefore, with Hanna openly backing 
I 
Roosevelt in the presidential preferential primary, a good indica-i 
I 
i 
tion might be had of the Songressman' s chances in the June primaryJ 
Hence, it appeared that state factional1sm was going to play a 
definite part in the presidential primary. 
i 
Meanwhile, the Democrats were not totally out of the polit1cai 
picture of North Dakota. There was no choice of candidates for 
the Democrats, though, because Governor John Burke's name was the 
only one o~ the ballot, despite the fact that at this time there 
were at least a dozen active candidates on the national scene. H. 
P. Goss, a historian of the pre-convention period, states that 
the Democratic hopefuls by agreement did not invade the territory 
of the favorite sons. Goss adds that Burke•s campaign in North 
Dakota did not attract national attention.50 Since there was litt1J 
chance of Burke's getting the presidential nomination, at Baltimor~~ 
i 
it was .said that his name appeared on the ballot merely so that he: 
might have the delegation from the state to trade of'f at the con-
51 
vention. 
However, the Democrats, too, had one of their leaders, 
William Jennings Bryan, come to North Dakota before the pres1denti~1 
primary. It was said that his presence was not as a Democra~ic 
candidate, but was merely to attend a meeting of the Democrats or 
50,Goss, 476, 484. 
51 Wahpeton Globe Gazette, March 14, 1912. 
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the state. By the tenor of his speech, though, it appears he was 
here to support La Follette's candidacy against Roosevelt rather 
than Burke's. At a meeting in Fargo, Bryan appeared more in a 
role of a sage and grand old man of his party when he addressed 
an audience of over two thousand people. Instead of confining his 
remarks to his own party and its candidates, Bryan jumped head-
long into the Republican ,arty battle and directed a scorching 
attack on Roosevelt and Taft. He warned the meeting of the danger 
of the third-term idea of Roosevelt's. He Stated: 
When yeu name the progressive men in the republican 
party, I am for Bob La Follette; he was progressive 
before Roosevelt could spell the word. I have gone 
to Wisconsin to help democrats do what they could to 
help elect La Follette governor of the state, and 
I've refused to stump that state for democrats who 
were against him. 
• • 
52 
• If I were a republican, I'd vote for La Follette. 
Even the conservative and anti-Bryan Fargo Forum was complimentary 
towards Bryan's speaking ability: "even the Roosevelt supporters, 
as well as the Taft sympathizers, who were in the audience greatly 
enjoyed his rapier thrusts that he prodded into each of these twe 
national leaders."53 
An interesting sidelight, and perhaps a commentary on the 
methods employed, developed in a quarrel between the progressive 
Minot Dai:J_y-7 Report~r and the stalwart Grand Forks Herald over the 
52 Grand Forks Herald, March 8, 1912. 
53 F~rgo Forum, March 8, 1912. 
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Herald's alleged refusal to publish some pro-La Follette material 
I 
i 
1n its columns. It seems that the Republican club of the Un1vers1tJ 
of North Dakota had declared itself for Robert M. La Follette and I 
had adopted resolutions which pledged its support to the Wisconsin 
Senator. These resolutions paid a special tribute to the grea~ 
ability and integrity of La Follette, and both of the Grand Forks 
dailies refused to publish them. The Reporter said the elub at 
the University was composed of a very large majority of the male 
students (women could not yet vote), and that it was in many ways 
a very powerful organization. This club was not md.sled by the 
Grand Forks stalwart papers, and it showed that Grand Forks was 
not overwhelmingly in favor of Roosevelt, as the Herald would have 
liked everyone to believe. It was maintained that the Grand Forks 
Herald, "evidentally recognizing the strength of the club and the 
I 
inf'luence of its action might have over a great many people," wouldl 
i 
net publish the resolutions. 
54 ' 
With less than a week to go before the election the issue 
was still much in doubt, and on the fourteenth of March, Senator 
La Follette left Washington for North Dakota to campaign in his 
own interests. This action worried many progressives in Washington:, 
declared the Fargo Forum. Some feared that because of the fight 
between La Follette and the ex-President the state's delegates 
might be captured by Taft. Tne paper went on to state that many 
progressives, in "an ugly frame of mind," were saying that Sena.tor 
54 Minot Daily Reporter, March 13, 1912. 
' 
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La. Follette was usacrif'icing principle to f'eed a grudge, and all 
the progressives who are pledged to La Follette, except, probably, 
those f'rom Wisconsin, will line up w1 th Roosevelt. n55 Nevertheless,: 
five days before the presidential primary La Follette arrived in 
' I 
the state for a. last minute swing through the larger towns, speak-· 
ing from the train platform in many of the. smaller localities. 
Making as many as ten to fifteen speeches a day, he covered the 
state thoroughly. In his f'our day tour of the state, "Ba.ttle-
Bob1s" strategy was to draw Roosevelt further into the open. Goss 
states that Roosevelt would not be tempted and that the Senato»::~ 
was forced to combat his former adherents, Ge.rf'ield and Gifford 
56 
Pinchot, instead of the Golonel. Roosevelt, more or less, stood 
on his record. 
In his first speech at Valley City, Senator La Follette gave 
a speech which he was to repeat many times before he left this 
state. His primary contention was that Roosevelt, when he was 
President, bad failed the American people by not taking really 
adequate and straight-forward steps toward the regulation and 
dissolution of the trusts. It was primarily during Roosevelt's 
tenure that the "combina~ions of capital" first became appalling. 
I 
It was Roosevelt's as well as McKinley's opportunity to take action! 
I 
in this matter and to settle this question before it could grow 
out of hand. A portion of La Follette's speech that he restated 
many times throughout the state was: 
55 Fargo Forum, March 14, 1912; March 18, 1912. 
56 Goss, 560-1. 
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and Minot large crowds attended the La Follette 
gatherings. 
La Follette's platform was explained in Minot. nB&ttle-Bob" 
told his audience just what he stood for and what he would attempt 
to accomplish if he were elected to the ~residency. High on the 
11st of proposals which La Fellette would back was the regulation 
and destruction of the giant combinations.59 
Other importa.nt___measures were the initiative, referendum, 
and the recall. La Follette attempted not to let personal feelings 
towards the other candidates enter into his speeehes, but when it 
did he was cautious in his remarks. In Bismarck, not far from the 
scenes of Roosevelt's ranoh1ng days at Medora, when asked a question 
about the Colonel, La Follette answered it in,a friendly manner, 
probably being careful not to offend the Medora friends of the 
Rough Rider. He said that he believed that the people of this 
country owed Roosevelt a debt of gratitude for all that he ha.a done' 
for this country and that few presidents set before the people such 
"moral standards, particularly regarding the holding of public 
60 
office." La Follette always reiterated that Roosevelt did, how-
ever, miss many opportunities for progressivism. 
Replys were not long in coming. While the 'little g1ant 1 was 
completing his tour of North Dakota, Alexander Revell, oh.airman of 
59 Minot Daily Reporter, Maroh 18, 1912. 
60 Grand Forks Herald, March 16, 1912. 
, I 
the Roosevelt headquarters and former owner of the Chicago 
declared from Chicago that Roosevelt did all that was humanly 
possible to curb suppression of competition by unfair methods. Hei 
.· i 
pointed out that the ex-President was the firs1i one to attack the I 
I 
big combinations, and that many of:>.his proposals were accepted and/ 
I 
made law. Roosevelt had curbed the railroad trust by giving powerj 
I 
to the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix rates; he had stopped] 
I 
rebates; and he had recommended the passage of a stronger Sherman i 
I : 
act. It was also pointed out that, by attacking the big combinati1ns 
like the Northern Securities Company, the Sugar trust, The Standar4 
Oil Company, and the American ~obacco Company, Roosevelt had I 
! 
demonstrated that he was not afraid of the big interests; 
61 
moreoverJ 
his actions had been upheld by the Supreme Court. 
On the eve of the election, March 18, both sides declared 
that they were confident of victory. John,F. Bass, in charge of 
the Roosevelt headquarters for North Dakota, decla~ed that al-
though the "issue has been befogged by state issues ••• the 
misunderstanding has been swept aside and he [RooseveliJ will re-
62 
ceive a rousing majority from the voters of his adopted stateo" 
The opposition felt the same way. H. M. Tucker, Chairman of the 
executive committee of the North Dakota Progressive Republican 
League, estimated that La Follette•s majority would be 3000 over 
61 Grand Forks Herald, March 16, 1912. 




the combined vote for both Roosevelt and Ta.f't. He stated that 
63 the opposition was to be surprised at the outcome. It is in-
dicative of the progressive strength in North Dakota that neither 1 
side appeared to consider Taft much of a threat. 
Election day arrived in North Dakota, but so did a blizzard 
which reduced the vote, especially in the western part of the state1. 
l 
Roads were blocked, and the vote in the rural communities was far 
below what was expected. There was some fear in the Roosevelt 
camp that the weather cond1tions were going to cut Roosevelt's 
1 strength in the western part of the state, where it was believed 
he had his greatest support. When the votes were counted and the 
results were made known, the La Follette progressives found that 
they had carried the state more strongly than they had anticipated. 
La Follette received an 8,578 vote majority over the combined vote 
of the Roosevelt and Taft. The final tabulation of votes gave 
La Follette 34,123, Roosevelt 23,669, and Taft 1,876. Roosevelt 
earried only 15 counties, out of a total of 49 in the state at 
1 this time. Burke received a total of 9,357 Democratic votes to 
win that party's delegates to their ktional convention to select 
64 
a presidential candidate. H1is, of course, was the only Democratic 
name on the ballot. 
;, 
A strange situation occurred when it was found that Senator 
Porter J. McCumber of this state received the Republican Party's 
63 Fargo Forum, March 18, 1912. 
64 All figures taken from the State of North Dakota 1913 
Legislative Manual, 234-242. 
endorsement for Vice-President. Although he got only 228 votes 
from the whole state, McCumber's name was the only one which was 
on the ballot, put there br the voters th~mselves. Therefore, 
strictly speaking under the presidential primary law the delega-
tion was pledged to support him for the Vice-Presidential nom-
! 
!nation. It was, to say the least, an embarrassing situation I 
I 
which was also to cause some confusion in the :f'uture for pro- I 
I 
gresaive delegates to find themselves pledged to support a thorough 
I 
stalwart for the Vice-Presidency. 
The significance of the election on the state level was that, 
i 
I 
it showed the devotion to progressivism of the North Dakota voters~ 
I 
The leading progressive candidate beat the forces of conservatism 
and 'favorite son• emotion. The voters seemed to disregard per-
sonalities and voted for ideals and realities--for the real pro-
gressivism of La Follette rather than the none to clear policies 
of Roosevelt. The speakers for Roosevelt during the campaign had 
spoken m<!lstly of what Roosevelt had done while he was Presiden 14! 
and very little of what he would do if he were elected again. 
According to the Minneapolis Tribune, the voters of North Dakota 
"saw these big names LRoosevelt, La Follette and TafiJ and shining 
personalities for the shadows they were and voted through ttlem to 
65 the solid realities of objects they wished to accomplish." The 
Tribune further stated that this state's voters did not dislike 
65 Fargo Forum, March 23, 1912. 
Taft more after the election, nor did they like Roosevelt per-
sonally less, but that they had no stomach for the reciprocity 
ideas of the former and the old Republican machine LMcKenzi.!7 
backing of the latter. 
Meanwhile the stalwart faction was explaining the results of 
the presidential primary. The most widely favored alibi was that 
the Democrats of North Dakota had invaded the primary in large 
numbers and east their votes for La Follette. The Fargo Forum 
declared that when all the election returns were in, the figures 
would show that the Democratic vote was short about the same amourt 
that La FGllette led Roosevelt. As an ea:ample of this, the Forum 
pointed to the results of the Cass county vote. trin Cass county 
the republican vote was larger than the republican vote of two 
years ago by 1,333. On the other hand, the democratic vote was 
smaller by l,334.rr 66 The Forum believed that similar conditions 
would be found to prevail elsewhere over the state. The present 
writer, after examining the official figures of the two e1ections,, 
has found little basis for the Forum's figures which were either 
false or based on misinformation. The official figures point out 
that John Burke received 9,770 votes in 1910, whereas, in 1912, he 
received 9,357 votes in the presidential primary election. The 
Republican votes, on the other hand, were 56,376 in 1910, while 
67 
in 1912 they were 59,668 votes. That many Democrats probably 
66Fargo Forum, March 29, 1912. 
67 State £f. North Dakota, 1913 Legislative Manual, 227-242. 
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voted for La. FGllette cannot be denied, but after a study of the 
official vote it is difficult to see how La Follette's victory 
can be attributed to the votes of Democrats. La Fellette's majority 
of over 10,000 votes would certainly not be entirely made up of I 
Democratic voters; after all, there were only 415 fewer votes for I 
Bu:rke than there were in the election two years earlier. 
I 
Nationally, the presidential primary election had much sig- 1 
nificance. National magazines and city newspapers pointed out the I 
effects which they foresaw in the North Dakota. results. Each majori 
I 
party and faction thereof, of course, had its own version of what 
happened in Worth Dakota, and its own guess upon what the ef'fect 
would be upon the national seene. In the lead article of the 
\ 
Literary Digest, after the North Dakota primary, the election was 
discussed very thoroughly. By: quoting from the newspapers of the 
1 contesting factions, and by making some comment editorially itself, 
the Literary Digest probably best summed up the comment for all 
68 
sides. The Digest declared that the immediate result of.the 
North Dakota primary was 0 increased bewilderment among Republ1o:an 
poll tie1ans, and unconcealed glee on the part of the Democrats.'' 
The following comments were taken from this article. 
Upon receiving the election returns, "joy displaced gloom at 
the La Follette headquarters in Washington for the first time sincel 
i 
the Senator's speech ••• in Philadelphia," reported a eorresponden'J; 
' 
of the New York Evening Post, and. the New York Times looked for 
65 uThe North Dakota Primary" The Literary Digest, XLIV 
(March 30, 1912), 623-5. ·~ 
57 
increased La Follette support throughout the western progressive 
states, but it gave him little chance in the East. The Des ~ines 
Register and Leader (R), after stating Roosevelt's candidacy look-
-
ed black, declared that the~ the 'Dakota fight' demonstrated 
foremost was that La F~llette was going to retain his leadership 
of the progressive wing of the Republican Party, defending it 
against anyone who attempts to supplant him. In other per1od1cais 
69 
the same sentiment was evident. Al though they believed the 
struggle was a hard one, these publications declared that La. Follette 
won·a. great victory in the North Dakota primaries. The Nation 
concluded that "La Follette got his revenge on these followers 
who had professed to be his supporters, only to jump on the Roose-
velt band.wagon at the first sign of weakness. n70 
Equally jubilant were the Democrats. "The Republican party 
is surely wallowing in a Slough of' Deepond,tt exclaimed the Demo-
cratic Pittsburg Post. It declared: 
There is no pity in the hearts of the people as they 
gaze upon the suicidal strife. It marks the beginning 
of the end of a party of which they are s71k and tired. 
A party that has outlived its usefulness. 
Furthermore, the Boston Transctipt (Ind.) reviewed the charge 
that the Democrats of North Dakota stole the primaries away from 
Roosevelt by voting for La Follette. The difference in the total 
vote with the vote of' previous elections was explained by this 
69Independent, LXXII (March 28, 1912), 594; Nation, XCIV 
(March 21, 1912), 275. 
70Nation, XCIV (March 21, 1912), 275. 
7lL1terary Digest, 625. 
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paper, ae a thing to be expected in an off year in North Dakota. 
Meanwhile, with the charge that the Democrats elected La 
Follette in mind, the Taft forces pointed to this accusation and 
stated that it was exactly why the Taft faction was opposed to the 
direct primary. Congressman William B. McKinley, in1eommand of 
the Taft forces declared: 
.L. 
In the absence of State law Lwith the party-enrollment featur~ 
it is easy to foresee that soap box primary rules would pre- · 
vail and the contest for the Republican nomination for Pres-
ident would degenerate into a national scandal i~wbich the 
Republican party itself would play a minor role. 
Other Republican newspapers like the Burlington, Vt., News and the 
Philadelphia Inquirer declared the election results showed that 
making a successful candidate out of Roosevelt was an impossibility~ 
The Philadelphia paper stated: 
We have been hearing nothing but the cry of primaries 
from Roosevelt. Give him primaries and he will sweep 
the country before him. Well, he has his primaries, 
and in a State devoted to radicalism and insurgency~ 
too. 
We have been told by the Roosevelt managers that the 
people were just waiting to hear the bugle-call for 
Roosevelt; that ,913~1ally would the so-ealled 'Pro-
gressives• flock to him. But the lesson taught by 
North Dakota is t~at the 'Progressives• are not fflr 
him by any means. 3 
I 
! 
Naturally the Roosevelt supporters viewed the election results; 
i 
from another angle. They maintained that the returns showed the 
only "one republican voter in forty" expressed a wish for Taft's 
72 Literary Digest, 624. 
73 !]&£. 
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re~mnation. Out of the Roosevelt headquarters in New York came. 1 
the following comment: 
No such humiliating, crushing defeat of a Presidential 
candidate asking renomination has ever been witnessed 
in American politics. Four years ago, in North Dakota, 
Taft received 57,680 Republican votes. In the primary 
election yesterday leas than 2,000 Republicans in North 
Dakota exprest a preference for his second nomination. 
The ten delegates to the National Convention elected are 
first, last, and all the time anti-T~ft. The delegates 
elected in North Dakota yesterday had given out signed 
statements several days ago that if elected they would 
support Mr. Roosevelt in the Chicago Convention when it 
was shown that La Follette could not be nominated. Those 
ten delegates can safely be put in the Roosevelt column. 
In attempting to explain away the "North Dakota cucumber," anobher 
Roosevelt manager issued the following statement which followed 
directly the line taken by the pro-Roosevelt Fargo Forum: 
Our reports indicate that practically ali the Democrats 
have voted for La Follette •••• If the Democrats bad 
stayed out of the Republican primary there is no question 
that Roosevelt would have won. 
Similarly, the pro-Roosevelt New York Evening-Mail stated that 
boss-rule did not run the Republican Party in North Dakota; it was 
the voters who ran the state. It also declared that the most 
significant fact of the election was that 95% of the Republicans 
of the state cast their votesiagainst the Taft administration.74 
Roosevelt apologists had the answers to the question why 
Roosevelt was defeated. A correspondent of the New York Tribune 
gave the following reasons. First, the close association and 
backing of George w. Perkins, who represented the Harvester Trust, 
had spelled doom for Roosevelt in North Dakota; the farmers of the 
74Literary Digest, 624 

Press prophetically declared: 
North Dakota is now a live wire running the length and 
breadth of the United States for the elimination of the 
principal two candidates whose personal warfare, waged 
with bitter hatred by the faction of each,spells wreck 
and ruin for the Republican party in November--wreek 
and ruin if the Taft faction desperately persists in the 
effort to nominate the President to be slaughtered at the 
polls by the Colonel's faction. And if the Roosevelt 
faction desperately persists 1n· the effort to nominate 
the Colonel to b~8s1aughtered at the polls by the Pres-
ident I s faction.·r 
Oscar K. Davis, a former Washington correspondent of the 
New York Times, and Secretary of the Progressive Party (Bull Moose) 
National Committee, stated a dozen years later that the Roosevelt 
forces had been practically unprepared for the North Dakota 
primaries, 79 and that Roosevelt had erred in entering the. strong 
La Follette state for his first test of strength. nBut the Roose-
velt men, everywhere, were so tremendously enthusiastic that their 
insistence in North Dakota as to the certainty of carrying the 
state led us to make the attempt, although against the better 
judgement of pretty much everybody in the East." He stated that 
the North Dakota Roosevelt movement was headed by a man (Hanna) 
who had distinguished himself in politics only through association 
with the standpat faction. "We had some pretty good politicians 
in our organizations, but we were children when it came to the 
gentle art of blanketing the other side by professing to be for it' 
and then doing absolutely nothing to support the profession. The 
78 Literary Digest, 625. 
79 Oscar K. Davis, Released for Publication: Some inside 
Eolitical history of Theodore Roosevelt and h!,! Time°sJ:898-1918 
(Boston, 1925), 275. 
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Old Guard worked that game on us from start to finish •••• 1180 
Davis claimed that the Roosevelt men of importance "backed and 
filled about the North Dakota primaries almost up to the day they 
were held. 11 It was only at the insistence o:f Roosevelt supporters 
measured by the strength of' telegrams f'rom the state to the effect 
that there was a good chance of carrying it for Roosevelt that 
the Roosevelt high command decided to stay in the race during the 
81 
last days of the primary campaign. The research of the present 
writer indicates that Davis's explanation is on the whole a corree~ 
one .• 
Per~1,ps one of the strangest of all the outcomes of the presi~ 
dential preferential primary election in North Dakota was the one 
pointed to bW the Philadelphia North American. This paper stated 
that in "Nnrth Dakota the President received 1659 votes, just 16 
more than the number of Federal office holders in the state. 1112 
After reading figures of this nature, one mi~t ask oneself 0 who 
were these 16 voters, and what were they doins in North Dakota? 1183 
80 Oscar K. Davis, Released for Publication: Some inside 
1olitical histmry £! Theodore Roosevelt and his Time"sT898-1918 ffi>ston, 1925), 27~. 
81 ~., 277. 
82 uThe Illino1_s and Pennsylvania Primariesn, The L1 terary 
Digest, XLIV (April 20, 1912), 796. 
83 The figures used by the North Ameriean were not official 
figures; they were incorrect by 117 votes, putting Taft with a 
final vote 1876. The point is still there,.however, because the 
question can merely be changed to "who were the 133 voters for 
Taft?" 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CHICAGO CONVENTION AND THE 
NORTH DAKOTA GENERAL PRIMARY 
64 
Tfie time that elapsed between the presidential preferential 
primary on March 19 and the general primary election on June 26 in 
North Dakota was a period of uncertainty. La Follette had won the 
State's delegates to the National Republican convention in June, 
but his chances of obtaining the nomination looked dim. The ~orth 
, Dakota progressives should have had a :reeling of triumph because 
their man had won, but this was not the case. They did feel that 
' victory in the general primary election of June 26 was nearer at 
' hand, but they were very cautious in their movements. Before the 
presidential primary, the North Dakota Progressive Republican 
League had stated that it considered Theodore Roosevelt as "the 
head and front of the progressive movement in the United States 
and should he become a candidate for the presidency, and his candid+ 
i 
acy be endorsed by the voters in this state at the primary," they 
1 would support him "not only by virtue of the mandate of the people, [ 
but loyally and enthusiastically as a splendid representative et 
' l 
progressive Republicanism." This statement was issued to disprove 
efforts which were being ma.de by n1nterested partiesn to place the 
1 progressives in a position of hostility to Theodore Roosevelt. In 
Washington, Congressman Helgesen, a La Follette man, refused to 
1 Grand Forks Herald, March 15, 1912. 
65 
talk about the results. He was said to have been plaased with 
2 
the outcome, but he felt that there was no reason for boasting. 
Perhaps he felt that the fight was not over and won, yet. 
The cause:of the stalwarts should have been weakened. by the 
recent defeat. Since their candidate for governor had openly 
backed Roosevelt, the set back mi~t have meant that defeat was 
also in store for them again in the J""une primary. In the stalwart,, 
favor, however, was the fact that they had beaten the progressive 
candidates in both the preceding state primary eleetion--in 1908 
and in 1910--and in the state conventions which were held before 
the primary law was passed. Their control of the party machinery 
on the state level had only failed when the progressives voted wit~ 
I 
the Democrats and in the recent La Follette-Roosevelt battle. As 
things stood, in the election of Congressmen the stalwarts and the. 
progressives were evenly divided; each ha.d a Senator and a Rep-
resentative in Washington. Because of the growth in the population 
as shown by the census of 1910, a third representative was to be 
added in the 1912 election. In short, the race for the state 
offices in 1912 was expeeted to be a close one, and both sides 
were treading softly to avoid any statement or acts which might be 
criticized or turned against them in this election. 
Newspaper sentiment was varied. The staunch progressive 
newspapers3 favored the progressive candidates for the state offiee:s, 
: 
2 Fargo Forum, March 20, 1912. i 
3 Such papers as the Minot Daily Reporter, The Fargo OouT1er-
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Republican. His chief opponent was w. P. Tuttle of Dawson who 
bad served in the state legislature since 1910. The other three 
candidates received little support and need not be discussed. 
In the third district the race was destined to be a close one. 
Of the five names on the ballot, three were outstanding. Alfred 
Blaisdell, Secretary of State from 1906-1910, was "highly respected! 
'I for the enemies he made" during his work while in office. "His 1 
first political reputation was made by his management of a series 
of successful campaigns in his part of the state against the do-
minating partisanship of machine politics which threatened the 
14 
right of good government." A second candidate for the nomination 
in the third diijtrict was L.A. Simpson. Simpson was a banker 
and had been a delegate from his county to every state convention 
of,~hi:s party since 1690, with the exception of 189b, when he was 
' absent from the state. After many terms in the various offices of 
the state, Simpson, a state senator since 1900, nattained. national 
prominence" in 1909-11, according to a very complimentary biograph~ 
by his conduct of the Russell case at Boston, in which he was chief'! 
counsel for the plaintiff and which involved an estate of half a 
million dollars; Simpson's friends liked to refer to the case as 
0 one of the greatest trials in the history of the American Bar."15 
The third candidate given a chance to receive the nomination was 
P. D. Norton. At the age of thirty-four, Norton had been elected 
l4 Hennessy, 575. 






as Secretary of State in 1910. He was engaged in many different 
lines of business, and he had been elected States Attorney from 
16 
1907 to 1911 in Adams County. The other candidates, including 
the Democratic candidates for the Congressional seats, had little 
bhanee of election in the fall. They do not merit discussion in 
this monograph. 
In the meantime, while very little campaigning was done in 
North Dakota in preparation for the general primary, the preparation 
! 
for attendence at the National Republican convention scheduled to 
open on June 18, in Chicago, was in progress. Two questions which. 
had agitated the North Dakota delegates for more than a month afte~ 
the presidential preferential primary election had to be settled. 
The delegates to the National convention17 were bound to support r 
La Follette for the Presidency, at least on the first ballot. 
After the initial ballot, or after La Follette released them, the ; 
I 
I 
question of who they would support was not answered, although many I 
. ~ 
observers argued that the delegates should then support Roosevelt. , 
This question remained unsettled; however, even the non-political 
l6 State of North Dakota 1911 Legislative Manual, 527. 
l7 The delegates were w. s. Lauder from Wahpeton, Robert M. 
Pollock from Fargo, P. o. Thorson from Grand Forks, A. L. Nelson 
, from Rollette, L.B. Gama.as from Sheyenne, August E. Johnson from 
Washburn, o. F •. Tofsrud from Rugby, James A. Cooper from Williston, 
Emil Scow from Bowman, and T. Twichell from Mapleton. State .2f 
North Dakota 1913 Legislative Manual, 238-241; Grand Forks Herald, 
March 2, 1912. 
18 Bismarck Tribune, June 21, 1912; Grand Forks Herald, Jan. 
1 5, 1912; "The North Dakota. Primary," Literary Digest, C (March 30, 
1912), 623. 
75 
North Dakota Farmer, edited by Dr. A. F. Ladd of the North Dakota 
Agricultural College, stated that "1 t is quite evident that Roose- · 
velt or another progressive Lwoul9:] be nominated ineli&~g,gQ!l9 The 1 
other question before the North Dakota delegates was whether or 
not they should support United States Senator Porter J. McCumber 
for the Vice-Presidency. It w111 be recalled that McCumber had 
received 228 votes for that office in the presidential primary. 
If this vote bound the delegates to support him for the Vice-
Presidential nomination, it would find progressive delegates re-
quired to support and to vote for a stalwart nominee. This question 
perplexed the delegates, especially one of them, Judge w. s. La.Ude~, 
who was especially hostile to McCUmber. Lauder had been on the 
political scene for many years. He had been a member of the North 
Dakota Cons ti tu tional convention wh1 ch met on · ;J"ulj:,,, lqi, 1889. Dur-
ing that conventiofti he had advocated a one-house legislature and a 
'migratory' supreme court which would meet for three terms a year. 
He had been appointed a District Judge at this convention, and 
later, in 1910, had opposed Hanna in the Congressional race of 
that year. He came in fifth in a field of nine. Judge Lauder was 
an ardent progressive and claimed to be the original La Follette 
leader. On the other hand, one Republican paper called him "a. 
broken-down, cast-out, trampled and disheveled stalwart, seeking 
20 revenge" on his old political companions. 
19 North Dakota Farmer, XIII (June 15, 1912), 18. 
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the outcome of the state convention, they either held another 
convention and elected a new set of delegates to the National 
convention, or.they unseated the opponents' delegates, and elect-
ed new ones. The result was two sets of delegates. This was 
true in such states as Michigan, Oklahoma, Texas, and Missouri. 
In the majority of these states there was no compromise between 
the two factions of the Republican Party, as did eventually occur! 
! 
in Missour1.25 The first two months of the campaign gave little 
cheer to the Roosevelt follow•rs; Taft already had many times the 
number of delegates Roosevelt had garnered. 
In the middle of April, however,,the tide had turned in 
favor of Roosevelt. In rapid succession the Colonel picked up 
delegates in the states using the direct primary system. He 
swept Illinois by over two to one, and shortly after, his Pennstl-, 
vania supporter, William Flinn, delivered sixty-five delegates 
to add to Roosevelt's total. "From then on until the middle of 
May almost every week withessed a Roosevelt victory somewhere in 
the country. In short order California, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
I 
Maryland, and South Dakota followed one another into the Roosevel~ 
26 I 
oolumn. 0 Roosevelt's chances were heightened greatly, and when 
the Ohio primary took place, nthe drama reached a climax." Taft, 
Roosevelt, and La Follette furiously stumped the state. urn no 
other campaign perhaps have three candidates engaged in such a 
25 Thomae R. Yancey, "The Election of 1912 in Missouri," 
(unpublished Mastera Tliesis, University of Missouri, Columbia, 
1937), 67. 
26 Mowry, 233. 
back-alley fight as did Roosevelt, Taft, and La Follette in Ohio." 
The r\sult was great victory for Roosevelt and a blow to Taft from 
his home state. When the results of the New Jersey election also 
proved favorable, Roosevelt felt "reasonably sure" of controlling 
the convention. 28 
Yet Roosevelt failed to win control of the convention. The 
Republican National committee, which he himself had appointed in 
1908, remained loyal to Taft as titular head of the party; when it 
met in Chicago on June 6, the outcome of its decisions on all the 
contested seats of the delegation, numbering 254 of the 1078 seats 
29 
in the convention, was obvious from the very start. The National 
commi tte,, 1n:;.deciding the contests, would make up the temporary 
1 roll of the convention, which would in turn make up the permanent 
roll. Because the Taft forces had the advantage of selection, they 
picked Taft delegates and put them on the temporary roll. Of the 
254 contested seats, 235 were awarded to Taft, leaving only 19 for 
Roosevelt. One writer believes that while about one hundred Roose-
velt contests deserved a thorough examination, the committee as a 
whole was less interested 
pledged to Taft to insure 
\ 
in justice than in seating enough delegat~s 
30 
his renomination. This was the first 
of Roosevelt's disappointments. That Taft secured the nomination 
27 Mowry, 235. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Pringle, Roosevelt, 563; Louis M. Hacker and Benjamin B. 
Kendrick, The United States Since 1865 (New York, 1936), 451. 
30 Mowry, 239. 
80 
by this method of manipulation is certain; however, it should be 
kept in mind that this is the same method by which many Presidents 
are nominated or re-nominated. Much of Taft's support came from 
the southern states where the Republican vote was very small, yet, 
their vote was Just as instrumental in choosing a candidate as were 
the votes of the northern states which had large Republican re-
i 
turns. The irony of' the situation is found in the fact that Roose~ 
1 velt had it within his power four years before to change this 
situation by recognizing a motion designed to apportion the number : · j 
'! 
of Republican delegates in a state to the number of Republican 
31 
votes. 
Meanwhile, Theodore Roosevelt decided to come to.Chicago to 
look after his own interests and take full command of the fight. 
He decided that the best chance ha had to receive the nomination 
lay in having the 
roll and replaced 
i 
contested Taft delegates purged from the temporarµr 
32 by Roosevelt delegates. If the contested 
delegates were excluded from the temporary roll, they would be 
disqualified from voting upon the temporary organization. A motiori 
' 
of this nature was to be introduced on the f'loor, stating that the! 
temporary roll made up by the National committee be amended. In a 
speech to his supporters, the evening before the opening of the 
convention, Roosevelt declared that if the contested delegates 
3l Mowry, 241. 




were allowed to vote he would have little chance for the nomina-
tion. His speech ended with the phrase,, nwe stand at Armageddon 
and we battle for the Lord," which became the battle cry of the 
Roosevelt cause. After the opening of the convention, the motion, 
was made by Governor Herbert s. Hadley of Missouri. He stated: 
••• The question is whether the national committee 
of the Republican party had the absolute power to form 
a temporary roll for this convention, which can only 
be changed by a report from a committee on this con-
vention, or whether 3~1s convention itself shall say 
who shall sit in it. 
But Hadley was ruled out Qf order, which meant that the temporary 
chairman would be elected by the delegates making up the temporary 
roll. This was the second major disappointment for Roosevelt in 
the Republican National convention. 
His third disappointment was the election of Root to the 
temporary chairmanship. The Colonel selected Govern.or Frane:ts,_1. 
McGovern of Wisconsin as his candidate for that position. The 
lines were drawn and a bitter fight resulted. Roosevelt hoped to 
gain the support of the La Follette delegates by picking a man 
from Wisconsin; he was partially successful. Judge w. s. Lauder 
, 
ef North Dakota seconded from the floor MeGoverns nomination. 
North Dakota's delegation voted for McGovern, except for H. M. 
Pollock of Fargo who decided to stand pat upon the caueus agreement 
and to cast his vote for Walter L. Hauser, La Follette's campaign 
manager, to preserve a neutral position.34 On the other hand, 
33 Yancey, 79. 
34 Bismarck Tribune, June 21, 1912. 
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' 
twelve votes were cast for Judge Lauder by delegates from Wis-
bitter determination" of half' the consin, "showing the • • • 35 
delegates "not to do anything that might help Colonel Roosevelt~~ l 
I 
i 
'flie other half of the Wisconsin delegates voted for McGovern. Thei 
final vote found Root with 558 to McGovern~ 502 votes. With this 
vote, Taft was assured of nomination, and Roosevelt men began to 
36 
talk of a third party. 
Nev6rtheless the North Dakota delegation was in a quandary. 
'!'heir votes, it was said, might defeat Roosevelt if La Follette 
persisted in holding them to the last. Although they were under 
instructions for La Follette, they declared they would be afraid 
to go back home if their alliance to La. Follette defeated Roose-
velt and nominated Taft.37 Roosevelt men ~ram North Dakota were 
trying to sway the delegation, and they declared that after the 
first ballot they had at least seven of the delegation who would 
not stand by and see Taft nominated if their votes could prevent 
it. The Bismarck Tribune stated that friends of Senator Gronna 
charged Judge Lauder and Tnomas Marshall, National Committeman-
elect, with political treachery. They claimed that these two men 
had called at Roosevelt's headquarters, a few days previous, and 
had agreed to deliver the delegation for Roosevelt6 1 
I 
I cand1da te for
1 
38 
temporary chairman. The equally conservative Grand Forks Herald ! 
35 Davis, 298. 
36 Mowry, 247-249. 


















































The rest were split as follows: Roosevelt 107; La Follette, 41; 
42 
CUmmine, 17; Hughes, 2. The total vote also showed that 334 
delegates refused to vote and "the three-fourths of the Roosevelt 
delegates signified by their silence that they had ceased to be 
Republicans."43 
Roosevelt's cry that the nomination of Taft was fraudulent 
and dishonest, may be dismissed, but bis claim that he was the 
choice of the rank and file of the Republican Party was based on 
the real evidence. Buch is the view of the author of what is 
probably the ablest Roosevelt biography, Henry F. Pringle, who 
cites as evidence figures of the presidential preferential primary 
elections throughout the country. Of the total of 388 delegates 
selected by the primaries, Roosevelt won 281, Taft 71 and La 
44 Follette 36. On the other hand in the states where the delegates i 
l 
: 
42 Pringle, Taft II, 809. Morison and Commager give their 
interpretation of what happened in Chicago: 
This question of the contested delegates is so enmeshed in 
precedent and party technique as to be almost insoluble for the 
layman. Jt is asserted on one hand that the same 'steam roller' 
methods were used by Roosevelt in 1904 and 1908 •••• It seems 
on the whole probable that even if all the contests had been fa1rl~ 
decided, Roosevelt would not have had a majority. Yet if Roosevel~ 
had allowed his avowed delegates to vote, it is possible though no~ 
probable that they might have won enough Taft votes to obtain the i 
nomination. As one member said, the Negro delegates were 'strain-! 
ing on the leash I to vote for Roosevelt. Mori son and Commager, 419!. 
43 :Mowry, 253. 
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time Roosevelt gained the platform the crowd was "already a half- i 
hyJterical thing." Mowry writes that Roosevelt began his speech 
with 11 Thou shalt not slieal11 , and "With narrowed eyes and snapping 
jaws, he proclaimed that he would accept the nomination of a new 
progressive party if it were made by a convention regularly calledj 
and regularly elected. From the answering roar which fairly shook' 
the building there could be little doubt that a new party would be 
organized. 048 
Meanwhile, back in North Dakota, the McVille Journal (prog-
Rep) stated that Taft's renomination, which it believed was pro-
cured by fraudulently elected delegates, was little short of a 
disaster to the Republican Party. The blame, this typical pro-
gressive paper declared, rested only on those who controlled the 
party machinery, and whose slogan seemed to be "Right or wrong, 
anything to beat Roosevelt." "The unf'ortunate thing is that it 
was not Roosevelt alone who was oeaten but it was the will of the 
vast majority of the rank and file of the Republican party which 
was trampled on by the bosses. 11 49 The Journal was greatly dissapoiiit-
ed in La Follette 1 s re:f'usal to permit his delegates to act with 
the Roosevelt delegates; the paper declared that this refusal 
weakened the position of those who fought against bossism. 
Only four days after the Chicago conventions, the North Dakota 
! 
general primary election was held. Conservatism had won out in 
48 
Mowry, 254. 
49 McVille Journal, June 22, 1912. 
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Ohicago, and regardless of who a North Dakota Republican had 
favored, his presidential candidate was to be President Taft. 
change of political attitude which waa necessitated by Taft's 
renomination was not so difficult for the North Dakota stalwarts. 
But at such a late date before the election, and because of the 
uncertainty which was prevalent, the National convention probably 
did not influence the primary election in North Dakota. If it 
did, the writer would expect that it would help the conservatives, 
of the state, more than it would the progressive facticm. 
There had been two significant occurrences in North Dakota 
in the final two weeks bet·ore the primary election. The first was: 
the entrance into the political scene of a muckraklln.g article, 
in the form of a circular, written about the legislative record 
of Congressman Hanna. The writer of this article, Robert M. Buck 
of Chicago, had been asked by La Follette to investigate ttcertain 
matters, 11 he claimed, but the conservatives charged the North 
Dakota progressives with bringing this writer into the state to 
smear the record of Hanna.so Buck's report was called 'impartial• 
but the Fargo Forum said that it caused ttquite a ripple of a-
'musement in local Republican circles" because of its obvious 
51 
attempt to belittle Hanna's record. Before he came to North 
Dakota, Buck had been one of La Follette's publicity men, and was 
said to have conducted the W1sconsin Senator's primary campaign in 
50 Libson Free Press, quoted from the Fargo Forum, June 11, 
1912; Grand Forks Herald, June 15, 1912. 
51 Fargo Forum, June 12, 1912. 
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the various states. The conservatives believed that Buck's coming: 
to North Dakota was the fulfillment of a pre-convention promise 
to the insurgent leaders of the state. The Forum declared that 
the in~urgents had carried the state for La. Follette, and now La 
Follette had sent Buck to help them elect their gubernatorial 
candida.te,,Buchanan; :the .·pa.per warned, however, that this investi-
11 gation will serve rather as a boomerang and do more good for Mr. 
Hanna in the long run as it gives his supporters a chance to tell 
1 
now what his record really is. 11 52 
The other event was a quarrel between Senator A.G. Gronna 
and National Committeeman-elect Thomas Marshall, which was be-
lieved to have begun during the Chicago convention because of 
the lack of cooperation Gronna received from Marshall. Gronna 
did not care for the manner in which Marshall handled the North 
Dakota delegates and trouble resultedt3 The Fargo Forum claimed 
that it knew of the coming break between the two Republicans weeks 
before it occurred; however, it stated that the progressives 
denied its claims and branded them as false. 54 The progressive 
52 Fargo Forum, June 12, 1912. Some of the measures Hanna , 
sponsored or claimed eredit for in Congress were: A pure-food law~ 
which was the model for North Dakota as well as other states, and ! 
which Professor Ladd of the North Dakota Agricultural College said! 
was the best enacted by any state; government aid for good roads ! 
on rural routes, and pensions for soldiers. Lisbon Free Press, 
quoted in the Fargo Forum, June 11, 1912. -
s3 Bismarck Tribune, June 21, 1912; Grand'Forks Herald, June 
19, 1912. 
54 Fargo Forum, June 25, 1912. 
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publications continued to state that there was harmony between 
Gronna and Marshall, even after the Chicago convention. On June 
23, the Fargo Courier-News declared that Gronna had told its 
reporter there was no friction between the two men.55 The Fargo 
, Forum replied immediately by publishing a communication from Gronn~ 
that the courier-~ was wrong on two oounts--there never had b~e~ 
any interview, and Gronna. was not friendly with Marshall. Gronna. 
stated that "Mr. Marshall showed by his own actions at the Chicago 
convention that he is my political enemy."56 Gronna was not in 
favor of the Marshall-Buchanan combination, the Forum went on to 
say. It predicted that in the future, with Marshall as National 
Committeeman and friend Buchanan,as Governor, and with the national 
\ and the state patronage at their command, the pair could strengthe~ 
their machine and eventually place Marshall in Gronna's place in 
the Senate.57 Another newspaper said that this break would "be the 
58 
biggest poll ti cal feature during the next two years. n Coming as 
did before the general primary this quarrel could have effected the' 
chances of either of the candidates immeasurably. Both Gronna and 
Marshall belonged to the ~Progressive Republican League and a split 
of this nature was going to effect the chances of its candidate,. 
55 Fargo Courier-News, June 23, 1912. 
56 Fargo Forum, June 24, 1912. 
57 Ibid., June 25, 1912. Before this time, Gronna and Marshal~ 
were companion candidates for the Senate. Grorma defeated Edward · 
Engerud and Marshall was defeated by Porter J. Mccumber. 
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former Governor J.M. Devine, Superintendent of Public Instruction 
c. H. Taylor, and Leslie A. Simpson, the man who was defeated by 
_ 63 
Norton ln the third 1.egislative district. Nevertheless, what 
the rest of the progressives were going to do, only the future 
could answer. 
Meanwhile, the Democrats were chl1Eing their presidential 
candidate •. Besides the names of such men as Governor Woodrow 
Wilson of New Jersey, Speaker of the House of Representatives 
Champ Clark of Missouri, and William Jennings Bryan, the.names of 
Eugene N. Foss, Governor of Massachusetts; Joseph w. Folk, former 
Governor of Missouri; and John Burke, Governor of North Dakota, 
were mentioned most often as 'dark horses' and possible compromise 
64 
candidates. Altr1ough they did not invade the territory of the 
favorite sons, both Wilson and Clark campaigned extensively for 
the Democratic delegates. By agreement, the favorite son was 
allowed a free hand in his home state. For example, Wilson and 
Clark did not oppose Burke in North Dakota, and Wilson had no 
formal opposition in New Jersey.65 We see, then, that when con-
vention time came around each candidate had a handful of delegates. 
Clark had the largest number of delegates; he was the candidate of 
the party regulars as well as of William Randolph Hearst, the 
63 Fargo Forum, July 6, 1912. 
64 Goss, 481. 
65 Ibid., 476. 
93 
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newspaper magnate. Wilson had the supp0rt of the progressive 
element of the Democratic Party. Because neither of the candidates 
had the two-thirds n~cessary for nomination, the favorite son's 
were in a position to bargain with their pledged delegates. Burke: 
66 of North Dakota had only ten delegates. and they were called 
complimenta:hy because "his campaign in his home state did not 
attract national attention •••• " says H. P. Goss, a historian 
of the pre-convention maneuvering. Burke had not entered in the 
contests of any other state; he had sought no delegates openly. 
o1 
The Baltimore convention, one of the most dramatic and thrill~ 
ing conventions in the history of the Democratic Party, was the 
equal at least of the Republican convention in Chicago. William 
Jennings Bryan and Judge Alton B. Parker, the Democratic candidate 
for President in 1904, appeared to be the powers behind the scenes 
at the convention. Parker beat Bryan for the temporary chairman-
ship by a vote of 519 to Bryan's 508. The result of this test 
seemed to indicate Clark's selection because the Harmon-Underwood 
forces from Ohio and Alabama68 which had backed Parker were the 
same forces which were supporting Clark. Hence, the Clark-Harmon-
I 
Underwood leaders had control of the convention, even though deman~ 
66 · "Burke for President" was the slogan adopted at a Democrat1¢ 
meeting in Fargo. Burke was to be accompanied to the Baltimore · 
convention by a large delegation of No:i:.tth Dakota Democrats. Grand 
Forks Herald, May 8, 1912. 
67 4·4 Goss, 8. 
68 Judge Harmon of Ohio had the support of Tammary Hall and 
Oscar Underwood represented the Bourbon Democracy of the South. 
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from all over the country are said to have denounced the reactiona~ 
69 element which had taken command. Because of this reaction Bryan 
emerged from this skirmish stronger than ever, 70 and holding the 
balance of power. , 
Although the Clark camp made every effort to placate Bryan, 
the man from Nebraska could not be persuaded out of his idea that 
Clark was tied in with the reactionaries. The climax to this 
situation was when Mr. Bryan offered the following resolution to 
the convention: 
Resolved, that in this crisis in our party's career 
and in our country's history this convention sends 
greeting to the people of the United States, and 
assures them that the party of Jefferson and of 
Jack~on is still the champion of popular government 
and equality before the law. As proof of our fidelity 
to the people, we hereby declare ourselves opposed to 
the nomination of any candidate for president who is the 
representative of or under obligation to J. Pierpont 
Morgan, Thomas F. Ryan, August Belmont, or any other 
member of the privilege--hunting and favor-seeking 
class. 
Be it further resolved, that we demand the withdrawal 
from this convention of any delegate or delegates con 
stituting or representing ·the above named interests. · 
This resolution was a bombshell. Bryan demanded a t'roll-call, and I 
I 
after he had been assailed, denounced, cursed, and almost physically 
I 
assaulted, he got it. He withdrew the final sentence of his res- : 
elution, but no one heard that and the eonv:e.ntion voted on it as a 
69Frank R. Kent, The Democratic Party: A .£V.story (New York, 
1928) , 396-7. 
70 Morison and Commager, 422. 
7l Arthur S • Link, Wi 1 son: The Road to the White Hou se, 
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nomination was Governor Burke of North Dakota. He received 387t 
I 
votes in the first ballot, which the W&hpeton Globe-Gazette thought 
was ua very nice compliment to a North Dakota governor and a good 
1 
advertisement :for North Dakota.If State senator w. E. Purcell of 
Wahpeton made the speech nominating Governor Burke and. 11 The governor 
i 
was given a rousing ovation at the close of the address."78 Never-
theless, Burke withdrew after the second ballot and Thomas R. 
Marshall, Governor of Indiana, was unanimously nominated on the 
second ballot.79 
' 
The platform adopted by the convention was predominately pro- : 
gressive in nature. It denounced the trusts and the various 
monopolistic practices in business and finance. It denounced the 
Republican tariff, and declared it to be a fundamental principle 
of the party that the government under the constitution has no 
right or power to impose or collect tariff duties except for the 
purpose of revenue. The platform provided for the adoption of 
La Follette's plan of basing rate-fixing on the valuation of a 
railroad's physical assets. While condemn1ng the use of the labor 
injunction, it promised currency reform and federal assistance in 
extending farm credit. The platform further promised legislation 
78 Wahpeton Globe-Gazette, July 4, 1912. 
79 It was believed that Burke withdrew his name in the interests 
of party unity, and with the promise of a high position in Wash-
: ington. He was later appointed Treasurer of the United States by 
President Wilson. Personal interview with Mrs. Florence H. Davis, 
Librarian, North Dakota State Historical Library, Bismarck, North 
Dakota, August, 26, 1949. 
98 
: providing full publicity for campaign contributions and a law 
prohibiting corporations from contributing. Besides anti-trust 
legislation, the establishment of a parcel-post system, and the 
regulation and control of private monopolies, the Democrats re-
iterated, as far as foreign policy was concerned, "the anti- , 
imperialist sentiment current in 1900 and pledged Philippine 
independence as soon as possible. 1180 
Thus, the Baltimore convention closed and two fundamental 
facts seemed evident. The nomination of Woodrow Wilson of New 
I 
Jersey should meet the approval of the west and of 1 ts progressives:. 
"Next to Mr. Bryan, Governor Wilson is the man whom the progressive:S 
of all parties were most desirous of seeing nominated."81 The 
' Devils Lake Journal, a Democratic newspaper, predicted that Gov-
ernor Wilson would carry North Dakota and that he would be elected 
without the slightest doubt. The second fact that was evident 
after the convention was that the Democrats had made the correct 
choice of candidates. The progressives of the Republican Party 
' I 
, now had a progressive candidate to vote for. Mowry asserts: nWheni 
Woodrow Wilson emerged victorious, the chances for a Roosevelt 
victory diminished perceptibly. Both Roosevelt and bis chief 
supporters admitted that. After Baltimore, Roosevelt wrote a frien,. 
that had Wilson been nominated before the Chicago convention, he 
82 
would not have remained in the fight." The Republican progressive, 
I 
80 Kent, 402-3; Wish, 165. 
81 Devils Lake Daily Journal, July 5, 1912; hereafter cited 


















The Progressive Party of North Dakota 
F&llowing the National conventions and the nominating· or 
candidates of the Democratic and Republican Party for President, 
there was :much speculation in North Dakota concel:'ning the possi-
bility or Theodore Roosevelt's forming a new party. Many leading 1 
newspapers discussed this subject at length. The Rugby Optimist 
(R) advanced the view that the progressives were likely to suppert: 
Wilson.1 Agreeing with the Optimist were the Wa-hpetQn· Globe-
Gazette (prog) and the Stanley Sun (R) which declared that the 
2 
nomination of Wilson put an end to the necessity for a third party. 
The two latter papers could see no advantage in a third party; 
they believed that its effect would be the disruption of the Re-
publican Party. Wilson, it was stated, was progressive enough for: 
North Dakota progressives. 
Nevertheless, other newspapers had different views on the 
thi.rd party threat. The Fargo Forum (R) declared that 1 t believed. 
many North Dakota voters would support Roosevelt to the end, but, 
it reasoned, for insurgent Republicans to support Roosevelt against 
Taft, would at least hurt Wilson's chances of catching the pro-
gressive vote.3 The Minot Independent (Ind) held a similar view. , 
1 Rugby Optimist, July 5, 1912. 
2 Wab.rn~t,r11 ·· Globe-Gazette, July 11, 1912; Stanley Sun, July 
17, 1912. 
3 Fargo Forum, July 8, 1912; July 9, 1912; July 15, 1912. 
Although this newspaper professed to have heard of not one solitary 
Republican in favor of the third party, it believed that the voters 
of North Dakota would have the opportunity to vote for Roosevelt 
either as the head of a third party or as an independent Republican. 
While the Minot paper believed that Roosevelt was the greatest 
Republican of the day, regardless of his new party affiliation, it; 
declared that the progressive wing of the Republican Party should 
be allowed to work within the party to eliminate these evils which• 
4 
the Colonel had cried out against. Even Congressman H. T. Helges~n~ 
believed there was little chance of a third party's playing any 
great part in the election in North Dakota. He, toe, credited the 
outcome of the Baltimore convention with putting a "damper on such. 
a movement throughout the entire country." Helgesen declared that 
Roosevelt's behavior at the Chicago convention and his attitude 
toward forming a new party made the Colonel appear as a spoiled 
child in the eyes of the rank and file of the voters. 5 In view 
of such sentiments plus the absence of any agitation in favor of 
the third party it appears that there was little demand for a new 
party in North Dakota immediately following the National conventio~s. 
However, that there was to be a third party in North Dakota 
I 
became clear with the announcement of the appointment of A. Y. More! 
i 
of Fargo as the ~erth Dakota member of the National Progressive 
Party's provisional committee. More was a prosperous businessman 
4 Minot Independent, as quoted from The Fargo Forum, July 15, 
1912. 




































claimed by More. Judge Lauder was reported to have been wr1 t- I 
ing to prominent Republicans about the state to ascertain what 
chances the third party movement had in North Dakota..s The results 
i of these activities were shown on July 22, when a call for the 
launching of the new Roosevelt Party was issued. The call for the 
convention asked all those who favored the movement, without regard 
to previous party affiliations, to meet in Fargo on July 26. The 
purpose of the meeting was to select five delegates to the National; 
Progressive Party convention which was~.to be held in Chicago on 
August 5. The Fargo meeting was also supposed to nominate Pro-
gressive candidates for the state offices to be voted upon in the 
November election. Anyone who wished to rebuke machine controlled 
conventions, or who favored reforms which have long been delayed, 
was welcome to participate in the convention. There were to be no 
election delegates to this convention; those who attended would be 
considered as delegates from the several eounties--1~eh loose 
·organization.a.methods were destined to cause trouble when the 
convention met, as will be pointed out below. Besides A. Y. More, 
the call for the convention was signed by the following men: 
1912. 
A. Beecher Cox of Valley City, A. o. Hazen of Larimore, 
o. J. Sorlie of Buxton, A. M. Baker of Fargo, s. M. 
Ferris of Dickinson, W. S. Lauder of Wa.hntoxL., Alfred 
Kyllo of Lisbon, Tollief Paulson of Kellf!re, Mayor Sweet 
of Fargo, and Dorr H. Carroll ct,Jliinat.. 
8 Ibid., July 15, 1912. 
9 Minot I d d t t d f th F"' F July 15 n epen en, quo e rom e c,,rgo ·orum, , 
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In Minot one of the signers of the convention call, Dorr Ho Carroll, 
tendered his resignation as chairman of the executive committee of 
the Ward County Republican central committee. In his letter he 
stated that he was taking this action so that he would be free to 
participate in the third party movement in the state.15 
The admirers of Roosevelt met at Fargo on June 26. Because 
the convention was ppan to anyone regardless of party affiliation, 
and because anyone attemding it would be regarded as a delegate, 
both factions of the Republican Party showed up in force and in 
equal numbers. What actually occurred may well be summed up in- a 
few worfl:s. The men who called the convention were the men who ran • 
it. The progressive Minot paper admitted that the test made to 
differentiate between the factions present was simple: when asked:: 
"are you ready to 'cut loose' from the Republican Party and affiliaite 
with the new party?" Anyone who answered 'yes' was allowed to 
16 , 
participate in the convention. Judge Lauder, as the chairman of the 
convention, kept a t1ght rein on the machinery of the meeting, and, 
over the objections of the stalwart representation which charged 
that the only reason that a third party was being formed was to 
'knife' Hanna, the progressives succeeded in establishing a new 
party. With considerable justification, the progressives accused 
the stalwarts of attempting to secure the party's gubernatorial 
14 Fargo Courier-News, July 24, 1912. 
l5 Minot Daily Repo~ter, July 23, 1912; Carroll was the owner 
of the Minot Daily Reporter; he sold it to c. A. Johnson, the un-
successful Republican candidate for governor, on August 1, 1912. 
A:fter this sale, the political sentiment of the paper turned cont 
servative. 
16 _!bid.,-July:--29,--1-912 •... 
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From the list of delegates it is easy to see that the men who 
called the convention were very much in evidence. As to the state 1 
ticket, action on this matter was postponed, although an attempt 
to prevent the organization of the party along state lines was 
i 
defeated. This situation is curious because the men who originated; 
the Roosevelt movement in the state were declared unfit to par-
ticipate in this convention by the men who supported La Follette 
in the presidential primary--in opposition to Roosevelt. 
The progressive convention maneuver, of course, stirred up 
l 
the pro-Hanna press. The protest of the Valley City Times-Record 
(R) was characteristic: "Not in the history of the state has there 1 
been so bare-faced, so fraudulent and so selfish a theft as that 
perpetrated at the state Roosevelt convention in Fargo. 1120 The 
Times-Record declared that nearly one half of the men who attended 
the convention were "railroaded out of the meeting'' on the order of 
Judge Lauder. They were disbarred from participation in the con-
vention.because they refused to desert every Republican candidate, 
both state and national, and support a new ticket, selected by 
21 
Judge Lauder, "the gag rule artist and debaucher of' clean pelitics." 
Another conventional stalwart paper, the Fargo Forum, declared that, 
the 'steam roller' tactics used at the Fargo meeting were worse 
than Taft used at the National convention. uNo steam roller. • • 
was ever run so effectually in a more determined spirit in the face 
20 Valley City Times-Record, as quoted from the Fargo Forum, 
July 29, 1912. 
21 ~-
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step after the Chica.go convention. 031 One paper stated that the 
reason the progressives were undecided which way to go was because 
the new party said nothing about the vital issues of the struggle, 
11 the only issue is Roosevelt.t• 32 For the time being the Progress-
ive Lea8Ue would not commit itself. 
Moreover, the question of the presidential primary, as it 
affected the political picture of the state, posed a serious problem. 
Although Hanna had supported Roosevelt in the March primary, it 
was said that he was under no obligation to the Colonel and his 
new party. When the ex-President quit the Republican Party, it 
was argued he gave up any obligations which Republicans owed him. 35 
Furthermore, after Roosevelt had used the contention that the will 
of the people as expressed in the primaries was the backbone of 
his third party movement, it was difficult to see how he could not, 
honor candidates elected by the primary method in North Dakota. B,r 
! 
establishing a state ticket in North Dakota, Roosevelt would not b~ 
34 
consistent with his own expressed principles. It will be re-
called that the decision as to whether or not there was to be a 
third state ticket in North Dakota had been left up in the air at 
the Fargo convention. The final decision was up to Roosevelt and 
the National Progressive committee scheduled at Chicago August 5. 
31 Fargo Forum, August 6, 1912. 
32 Williston Record, August 1, 1912. 
33 Valley City Patriot, as quoted from the Fargo Forum, Aug. 
2, 1912. 







































rich men who believed in Roosevelt, "social workers who had labored! 
in the slums of the great cities and knew the wretched lot of the 
poor, and a miscellany of reformers and cranks with plans, proposa~, 
37 and schemes enough to daunt the hard.iest, 0 were all in attendance. 
Like a group of crusaders, the delegates were filled with emotion, '. 
I 
singing hymns and wiping tears from their eyes. Enthusiasm mounted!, 
and there were at least 10,000 people in the convention hall after 
the delegations entered. The North Dakota delegation marched into 
the hall, each member wearing a red bandanna handkerchief about 
38 I 
his neck, a popular emblem of the Bull Moose ~arty. Hiram Johnsoni 
entered the hall at the head of the California delegation bearing 
a banner: 
'I want to be a Bull Moose, 
And with the Bull Moose stand, 
With antlers on my foehead, 9 And a big stick in my hand. 1 3 
The New York delegation had the touch of religious fervor, and a 
little uneomo.tous humor as it marched down the aisle, led by Oscar 
s. Straus, a noted Jewish philanthropist, si~ing: 
'Onward Christian soldiers! 
Marching as to war:40 
Amid the great enthusiasm which accompanied the first meeting 
of the Progressive Party, the North Dakota delegation selected 
37 Louis M. Hacker and Benjamin B. Kendrick, The United States 
since 1865 (New York, 1936), 453. 
38 Fargo Forum, Aug. 6, 1912; Claude G. Bowers, Beveridge 
and the Progressive Era (New York, 1932), 425. 




chairman. Dorr H. Carroll was elected secretary; 
~ver Serumgard, the blind politician from Devils Lake, formerly 
a Democrat and member of the resolutions committee of the 1904 
National Democratic convention, was selected as North Dakota's 
representative on the resolutions committee; and David Bartlett ef 
Cooperstown, former Republican Lieutenant-Governor of North Dakota 
was selected to serve on the credentials committee. When Roosevelt 
arrived at convention hall, Sylvanus Ferris was the first Northwest! 
man to greet him. Ferris had pUnched cows with the ex-President 
when the latter was in North Dakota. Roosevelt placed a silver 
bull moose upon the lapel of Ferris' coat.41 Later, the Colonel was 
photographed in a group with four North Dakotans with whom he had 
been in the cattle business in 1ae3 at Medora, North Dakota. These. 
men were A. w. Merrifield, s. M. Ferris, E. w. Meyers, and Joseph 
Meyers, all delegates of the convention. When the convention got 
under way, Serumgard, together with Hugh Halbert of Minnesota, led 
a successful effort to reduce the party's platform from 9,000 to 
3,000 words. 42 
In the meantime the convention opened with Senator Albert J. 
, Beveridge delivering the keynote address. Aft~r a humanitarian 
41 t The bull moose became the symbol of the National Progressive 
Party after Roosevelt said, 11 I feel like a bull moose 11 to the re- · 
porters the first morning after his arrival in Chicago at the time 
of the Republican convention. Arthur Brisbane, the Hearst man, 
took up the phrase. The bull moose Roosevelt became instantly, a 
very wrathful, red-ayed, much roaring animal. The word spread all i· 
over the nation. It was adopted by the Roosevelt managers, and it 
became the signal and sign of the party. A moose head hung above 
the convention in Chicago. Little metal stick pins were distribut-
ed, and the bull moose symbol went on the ballots in many states--
--Bismarck Tribune, August 12, 1912. 
42 Devils Lake Journal, Augusto, 1912. 
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laws for labor, trials by jury in cases of contempt arising out of• 
injunction suits (also for labor), health and safety laws, the 
prohibition of child labor, a minimum wage for women, an eight 
hour day for women and children and the abolition of night work, 
abolition of the convict contract labor system, workmen's compen-
sation, continuation schools, and the establishment of a Depart-
ment of Labor in the Cabinet. There was a straight-forward pledge 
to enact social insurance laws to protect workers against sickness 
unemployment and old age.46 
After the platform was ratified, Roosevelt and C-overnor Hiram 
Johnson of Califonlia were nominated by acclamation for the Pres-
idency and Vice-Presidency respectively. The convention adjourned 
and the delegates went home. 
Before the North Dakota delegation started home with the news 
of the Chicago Progressive convention, they received word from the 
Roosevelt headquarters that it was imperativ.e to put up a Pro-
gressive state ticket in North Dakota. An announcement to that 
effect was issued immediately after the delegation returned home, 
and a few days later, August 19, a call was made for a convention 
of the state and countyeentral committeemen and their alternates 
to meet in Fargo on September 6.47 Theodore Roosevelt was to be 
present to address the convention. 
46 Hacker and Kendrick, 453-454. 
47 ,,.,_ Fargo Courier-News, Aug. 19, l9i3; Minot Daily Reporter, 
Aug. 12, 1912. -
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Opposition to the third state ticket was forthcoming almost 
immediately. In fact, even before the announcement that there 
would be a third ticket, Charles B. Cheyney, who wrote for the 
Minneapolis Journal, reported that while many of the Nerth Dakota 
progressives were opposed to Hanna for governor, they would "be 
willing to compromise and refrain from putting another candidate 
in the field if Hanna will desert the old organization and work 
with the real progressives in the state.'148 Many North Dakota news-
papers declared themselves opposed to the plan primarily because. 
i 
49 they believed it was just an attempt to discredit and defeat Hanna. 
These same papers called the leaders of Roosevelt movement in 
North Dakota a ngang of disgruntled politicians, .. and stated that 
the Roosevelt's cause would suffer in North Dakota because of thein 
leadership. The Mandan Pioneer predicted "that the temper of 
North,)Dakota Republicans is such that if it comes to case of 
sacrificing Roosevelt or Hanna, it will not be Hanna. 1150 Other 
papers which were anti-Roosevelt said that the third party movement 
was led by the "Magnetism of a crazy offiee seeker," and that with-: 
out Roosevelt in front of the party there would be no party. The 
48 Minneapolis Journal, quoted from the Devila Lake Daily 
Journal, Aug. 9, 1912. 
49 Mandan Pioneer, quoted in the Fargo Forum, Sept., 2, 1912; 
Wilton City Eagle, quoted in the Fargo Forum, Aug. 28, 1912; Powers 
Lake Echo, quoted in the Fargo Forum, Aug. 29, 1912; Valley City 
Times-Record, quoted in the Fargo Forum, Aug. 29, 1912; Rugby 
Optimist, Aug. 23, 1912. 
SO Mandan Pioneer, quoted from the Fargo Forum, Sept. 2, 1912. 
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party existed only to elect Roosevelt, and there would be little 
51 regard shown towards needed' reforms, stated these newspapers. To 
these papers, then, the Roosevelt movement seemed to be little more 
than an attempt to defeat Hanna and carry on the trend which had 
been started in 1906, when the Republicans had split and a Demo-
cratic governor ha~ been elected every term thereafter. 
Nevertheless, the Progressive ~arty leaders began work 
immediately upon the task of organizing the party locally. Each 
county was to choose a county central committee as well as a state 
11,1ho 
central committeemanAwere to attend a state meeting at which they 
were to call a state convention which was to place a third ticket 
52 
in the field. Moreover, one of the results of a meeting of the 
executive committee of the Progressive Party in Fargo on August 14 
was that an agreement was made whereby there would be active and 
close cooperation between the original Progressive Republican Lea~ 
51 Ambrose Newsman, quoted from the Fargo Forum, Aug. 28, 
1912; Charlson Journal, quoted from the Fargo Forum, Aug. 22, 1912;i 
Powers Lake Echo, quoted from the Fargo Forum, Aug. 22, 1912 • The ! 
following was quoted in the Adams County Record, Aug. 22, 1912, The 
Bowman Citizen stated: 
Nothing so vulgar as the hound dog song heard 
around the convention hall in Chicago last week, 
during the formation of the Third Term Party. 
Something more classical was demanded and the 
following is said to have been the favorite: 
"My Country, 'tis of me 
sweet Land of mostly me, 
Of thee I yell; 
All rule belengs to me 
Perkins, Bill Flynn and me, 
For President take me, r, 
Or go to---~---------!. 
52 Minot Daily Reporter, Aug. 16, 1912. 
and the members of the Progressive Party. It was announced that 
uthe leaders of the old league would be looked to by the new for 
assistance they will be able to render in the way of advice and 
counsel as to men and methods."53 Organization of the Bull Moose 
Party was held up for a short time, however, when, on August 25, 
most of the documents of the party were stolen from Dorr H. 
Carroll, chairman of the St•te Central committee, while traveling 
on a train between Fargo and Minot. The documents included all tlB 
eo~respondence to date, and the list of committeemen throughout 
the state.54 
As the Progressive Party was being organized throughout the 
state, many guesses were made as to who would get the party's 
nomination for governor. Perhaps the first~name mentioned was 
that of H. H. Aaker of Fargo, a man who had run for the Republican 
gubernatorial nomination in 1910. Aaker owned a business college 
in Fargo, and another in Grand Forks. On August 31, however, Aaker 
I issued a statement in which he declared he was out of the race. 
Aaker stated that he had nno itch for office", and he would rest 
"content with having been mayor of Moorehead -for a. year, more than, 
a decade ago and that is sufficient glory.u55 Another name mention~ 
ed was James A. Buchanan, who had been defeated by Hanna in the 
53 Fargoalurier-News, Aug. 15, 1912. 
54 Fargo Forum, Aug. 27, 1912. 




primaries a month earlier. Buchanan was also reported to have 
declined to consider the nomination because he was willing to 
abide by the primary decision.56 Lieutenant-Governor Usher L. 
Burdick was mentioned, but he said he opposed a third party state 
ticket. Burdick stated that Wilson was progressive enough to sui~ 
. . 57 · any progressive not pleased with the Taft administration. Others 
i 
mentioned for the gubernatorial nomination were Mayor w. D. sweet l 
of Fargo, Dorr Carroll of Minot, David Bartlett of Cooperstown, 
and Judge Lauder of Wahpeton. 
Such was the picture when Theodore Roosevelt arrived in Nort~ 
' 
Dakota. Visiting and speaking first at Grand Forks, Roosevelt con~ 
tinued on to Fargo in his.private car, accompanied by Dr. Creegan, 
President of Fargo College, and Mayor Sweet of Fargo. The Colonel: 
I 
conferred with Creegan and Sweet, and it was reported that the 
Rough Rider, chiefly responsible in the first place for the decisipn 
to put a third state ticket in the field in North Dakota, had 
talked Creegan into accepting the gubernatorial nomination.58 
Speaking in the open air at Island Park,59 Roosevelt's theme was 
56 Fargo Forum, Sept. 5, 1912. 
57 Ibid.; Fargo Courier-News, August 28, 1912. 
58 Fargo Forum, Sept. 6, 1912; Grand Forks Herald, Sept. 7, 
1912. Creegan had been a friend of Roosevelt since he became 
acquainted with the Colonel when the latter was Police Commissioner 
in New York. 
59 It is interesting to note that before Roosevelt's arrival 
in Fargo, it was made plain that all the members of the reception 
committee which were to greet the Colonel were not necessarily 
allied with the third party, but that they were named because of 
either their personal acquaintance with or admiration for the 
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gave the keynote speech. He declared that the new party was a con~ 
tinuation of the movement of the convention held in Chicago on 
August 5. Theodore Roosevelt addressed the convention and then 
left. He stated: "Every man who does not support the progressivee 
is doing the work of the reactionaries •••• We have come to 
armegeddon and the men who won't stand with us are standing with 
~ . 
the powers of evil. 11 Judge Nehemiah Davis of Minot was introduc~ 
ed as the temporary chairman, and he stated that from this time 
on, he would never vote the Republican ticKet again. The Pro-
gressive convention confirmed the earlier rumor about Roosevelt's 
choice by haming Dr. c. c. Creegan as its choice to be their party s 
state standard bearer. In his speech of acceptance Creegan said 
the following: 
Roosevelt is a man whom I love, now since my father 
has gone to his reward, better than any other man • 
• • • I don't believe the~~ is a man in this hall 
who has gone ;~ough a more terrific fight than I 
have in making up my mind that I must stand upon a 
new platform •••• I have never been an office 
seeker and I never aspired to become a candidate for 
the governorship •••• I have done no wire pulling 
•••• I have come to feel that both the old parties 
are ••• boss ridden •••• There has never been 
written since the Declaration of Independence a 
document equal to :the platform adopted at the Pro-
gressive •etl~9l,ro Bb.ic.a.g,e. Roosevelt is the greatest 
man the country has . seen since Abraham Lincoln closed 
his eyes. 63 
62 Grand Forks Herald, Sept. 7, 1912. This convention was 
unique in the history of North Dakota political gathering because 
it was th~ first of its kind in which women were seated as delegates 
and were accorded the saine privileges as men. There were about a 1 
dozen women ·there. Fargo Forum Sept. 6, 1912. 
1 
63 Selected sentences from Creegan's speech, Fargo Courier-
News, Sept. 7, 1912. 
On the question of a state ticket the convention effected 
something of a. compromise between those who demanded a third party 1 
state ticket and those who opposed one. It endorsed the old line 
progressive leaders who were Republican candidates for state 
offices. These included everyone except the nominee for Governor, 
the Congressmen, and the Commissioner of Agricul~ure and Labor. 
But only a gubernatorial candidate was nominat.ed; the other places 
were left vacant for future action. Tnere was even a hint of 
apology in the reason given by the convention for its putting forth 
a state ticket. It was said that to get the ticket on the ballot 
in the coming elections, state candidates had to be put on the 
ticket so that the third party could poll the necessary 5 per cent 
vote needed to fulfill the requirements of state law. This might 
be taken to indicate, as the anti-•rogressives had charged, that 
the third party was mainly a National organization. The fact that 
only a gubernatorial candidate was chosen might also indicate that 
not many Progressives were in favor of the third ticKet,or, at 
i 
i. 
least, that not many wished to obtain the nominations of the other: 
I 
state offices. The stalwarts countered the Progressive reasoning 
by saying that if the Progressives had endorsed Hanna, they would 
64 ! 
not need to worry about polling any 5 per cent vote. Nevertheless~1 
! 
the convention adopted a platform which consisted of a broad state~ . i 
ment of party principles and then adjourned. 
64 Cooperstown Courier, quoted from the Fargo Forum Sept. 18, 
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Biblical rules an~ principles were cited and they gave the plat-
form a distinctive evangelical flavor. The platform closed with 
the n:sattle Hymn of the Republic." With some justification, the 
conservative Grand Forks Herald called the Progressive platform a 
combination of 11 high flown phrases" and "a curious jumble of 
66 misquoted poetry." 
By selecting Creegan as their candidate for governor, the 
I 
Progressives made a mistake. Creegan, a fine man with many friend~ 
in North Dakota, had no political record. He had been present at 
the Grand Forks Roosevelt convention before the presidential 
primary and had been chosen a delegate to the National convention,• 
although he later withdrew. When Hanna received the gubernatorial 
nomination, Creegan, out of a large crowd that wished to congratu-
late the nominee, had been the first one to shake his hand and 
67 
personally congratulate him. Two days after the nomination of 
the college president, he was found to be ineligible because he 
could not fulfill the resident requirements established by the 
constitution of the state. He had only lived in North Dakota 
' three and a half years; state law then as now required a five year• 
residence. On September 9, Mayor w. D. Sweet of Fargo was selecte4 
I 
by the executive committee as the new candidate. He was an ardent 1 
Progressive, and had served one term in the state legislature in 
1905. In his race for Mayor of Fargo in 1911, Sweet won by a 
'-
66 Grand Forks Herald, Sept. 7, 1912. 
67 Fargo Forum, Oct. 19, 1912. 

the fact until the Colonel was out of the state. In announcing 
Sweet as the new candidate, the executive committee which did the 
nominating acted beyond its actual functions, charged the Times-
Record. If the letter of the law were adhered to, the third state 
party could have no candidate for governor except by calling 
another convention.71 
third party movement. 
I 
The Times-Record, of course, was against th31 
However, in the eyes of other papers the 
new candidate appeared to be a strong one.72 Regardless of his 
chances and of the charges made about his candidacy, Mayor sweet 
declared, after he was notified of his nomination, that he would 
make a vigorous campaign, and he would ao all in his power to 
carry North Dakota for the national and state tickets.73 
About this time Roosevelt's chances were given a great boost 
by the Republican state central committee, which adopted a resolu-
tion, which said that in view of what had occurred at the National 
Republican convention, support of President Taft would not be re-
garded as a test of party fealty. 
I 
In fact, the committee, althougb.1 
I 
it pledged support of the state ticket, aetually denounced the 
nomination of Taft. Thus a Republican was not required to vote for 
his party's choice for President, but could, indeed, vote for a 
71 Valley City Times-Record, quoted from Fargo Forum, Sept. 
11, 1912. 
72 Minot Daily Reporter, Sept. 10, 1912; Adams County Record, 
Oct. 24, 1912. 
73 Fargo Forum, Sept. 10, 1912. 
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Democrat, a Socialist, or a Bull Mooser. The conservative press 
declared that such a stand was an out and out surrender. The 
effect, believed these papers, would be to give the Republican vote 
of North Dakota to Roosevelt.74 
Meanwhile the Reput)licans were attacking the third party and 
its new state ticket; three points were stressed. The rirat was 
that the Progressives refused to abide by the decisions of the 
primaries on Hanna and hence were repudiating their own tenets. 
The Republicans put the issue of the coming election as a test of 
the real value of a state primary law: "If a nomination at the 
primary has no meaning, and that lf the obligation of Republicans , 
to vote for a Republican candidate fairly chosen can be lightly 
dismissed, then what is the effect of the future of the party?rr75 
They pointed out too that in the primaries all three candidates--
Hanna, Buchanan, and Johnson--had run as Republicans; therefore, 
they should support the successf'ul contender. The Progressives 
countered this by pointing out that Hanna did not have an actual 
majority of first choice ballots in the elections, that actually 
the combined vote of the two progressive Republicans, nearly two-
thirds of the total cast, clearly demonstrated that North Dakota 
' Republicans did not want Hanna.76 While the Republicans were 
74 Bismarck Tribune, Sept. 6, 1912; Fargo Forum, Sept. 6, 191~ 
Grand Forks Herald, Septl 8, 1912. 
75 Q,uoted from a statement by the Republican state committee, 
1 Fargo Forum, Oct. 3, 1912. 
76 Fargo Courier-News, Oct. 11, 1912. 
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demanding that the Progressives abide by the state primary, the 
Progressives pointed out that the stalwarts were not consistent 
either. For example, P. D. Norton,' a progressive, who was nominat-
ed for Congress in the third district, was being contested in the 
courts by the stalwart he had beaten.77 Further reasons for not 
abiding by the primary were offered by Dorr Carroll. He declared 
that the primary campaign was not any eiection, that it was simply 
, a substitute for the old convention system of putting candidates 
in nomination. He stated the progressives had never elected Hanna, 
that they voted for his opponents, and would do so again. The 
reason given by Carroll for the Progressive Party's endorsing some 
of the candidates who were nominated on the Republican ticket was 
that the Progressive convention believed these men to be fit ex-
ponents of progressive principles. There had been ho political 
78 deal, Carroll stated. 
The second reason the Republicans gave for finding fault with 
the Progressive Party, closely related to the first, was that it 
was primarily an anti-Hanna party. Many newspapers believed that 
the sole purpose of the party's existence in North Dakota was be-
cause of the 0 little coterie of anti-Hanna Men" who wanted to 
defeat Hanna.79 By endorsing practically the whole Republican 
ticket, the Progressives showed their colors, it was stated. 
77 Fargo Courier-~, Sept. 21, 1912. 
78 
Minot Daily Reporter, Oct. 14, 1912. 
79 Crosby Review, Sept. 12, 1912; Devils Lake World, quoted 
from The F~rgo Forum, Sept. 21, 1912; Mandan Pioneer, quoted from 
Fargo Forum, Sept. 21, 1912; Bismarck Tribune, Sept. 23, 1912. 
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Another point was stressed concerning Progressives' repeatedly 
choosing a candidate from Hanna's home town. In the first plaee, 
Creegan of Farl!J;o was put up; but when he was declared ineligibie, 
another man from the same city was put in his place. Surely, said 
80 
the Devils Lake World, all the progressives did not live in Fargo. · 
Perhaps the sorest spot was that Roosevelt him~elf had sanctioned 
81 
the opposition to Hanna, his old time friend and champion. This 
lack of gratitude on Roosevelt's part was believed to be one reason 
Roosevelt's chances were weakened by his visit to the state, decla~ed 
the anti-Progressive Party Mandan Pioneer, while speculating on the 
election outcome in the fall. 
The last reason, and perhaps the least important for the 
fault-finding of the Republicans, was the third-term. The electio~ 
of 1912 provides the first example where the issue of the third-
term was carried into the electoral campaign. The Bismarck Tribune! 
considered the third term question to be of paramount importance. 
The Tribune stated that the third•term aspirations of Roosevelt 
showed his lack of good faith in tradition. Instead, it declared, 
Roosevelt supporters for the purposes of factional revenge, and 
through blind hero worship, were supporting a eandidacy "which 
82 1 
strikes at one of the fundamental principles of American government,. u 
80 Devils Lake World, quoted from the Fargo Forum, Sept. 21, 
1912. 
81 Bismarck Tribune, Sept. 23, 1912. 
82 Ibid., Oct. 21, 1912. 
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However, according to a recent writer, although the third-term 
question might have cost Roosevelt some votes, it was never an 
important issue.83 
In the meantime, the Progressives were carrying on a brisk 
anti-Hanna campaign. They allied the Republican nominee for 
governor with the old 'Ringmaster', Alexander McKenzie. It was 
pointed out that Hanna had been chairman of M.cKenzie' s state 
central committee, and that if he were elected, Hanna would do 
11 everything in his power to restore the unblushing McKenzie to 
his former political preatige. 1184 The Bowman Citizen declared that 
the way to kill the McKenzie machine was to defeat Hanna. Nation-i 
ally, La. Follette Weekly (~he Pro~ressive?) raised the same issue 
in a review of Hanna's 6ongressional career. This publication 
declared that Hanna was nthe political henchman of Alexander Mc-
Kenzie, who, with the Jillf Hill interest, has been boss of' the 
northwest for the special interests in politics. 11 In Congress 
Hanna was said to ha.ve voted for nuncle Joe 11 Cannon five times on 
the very first day of his 6ongressional service, thereby aligning 
himself with the Cannon-Tammany-Wall Street orgaru.zations. This 
publication further proclaimed th.at Hanna had voted for the Payne-
Aldrich tariff; for the Taf.t-Wickersam Railroad Bill, a measure 
83 Charles w. Stein, The Third Term Tradition (New York, 1943, 
204. 
84 Bowman Citizen, quoted from Devils Lake Daily Journal, 
Sept. 2, 1912. 
only the railroads wanted; for big business; and for home con-
sumption.85 When Hanna announced his backing of Taft for President, 
the degree of his conservatism was known to the voters. What with 
hls allegiance to the President and his McKenzie background, the 
voters in the fall election knew full well where he stood. After 
Hanna's announcement, the Progressives claimed many voters had 
come out openly for the Progressive ticket.86 
While on one hand the Progressives were exchanging accusations 
with the regular Republicans, they also were struggling to get their 
ticket on the election ballot. Because of a state law that a 
candidate's name could not appear on the ballot twice, the Re-
publican candidates who were also endorsed by the Progressives 
had to choose the column in which they wished their name placed. 
The Progressives lost a major decision when all the candidates 
who had both Progressive and Republican endorsements declared them-
selves in favor of the Republican column and announced they would 
support the ticket nominated by the voters in the primary. Another' 
blow was the announcement of the Secretary of State, P. D. Norton, 
a progressive Republican, that only three columns would appear on 
the electoral ballot. The Republicans and the Democrats each wouldi 
occupy a separate column; the Bull Moosers, Socialists, and P,ro-
hl.bition candidates would have to go under the individual nomina-
tion heading. The presidential electors, unless Democrats or 
85 La Follette 1 s Weekly, March 16, 1912, quoted from the 
Devils Lake Journal, Oct. 25, 1912. 
~6 Fargo Courier-News, Oct. 20, 1912. 
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Republicans, would have to go under individual nomination head 
187 
also, creating much confusion in the matter of choosing candidates, 
! 
With the announcement of the ticket plan, the Progressives immedi-
ately made a fight for a separate column on the state ballot. Leg~l 
authorities were consulted and mandamus proceedings were to be 
88 
started at once, it was announced. Probably because of the 
pressure put upon him by the Progressives, Secretary of State 
Norton announced on October 7 that the ballot would be composed 
I 
of five columne, one each for the Republican, Democrat, Progresaiv~, 
Socialis), and Prohibition parties.89 Norton still kept the original 
idea of three columns, however, the difference being that the thir4 
column was divided into three sections, one each fqr the Socialist$, 
Progressives, and Prohibition parties. 
But the Progressives had a victory in some sudden develop-
ments among the presidential electors. It will be recalled that 
the electors selected in the presidential preferential primary by 
the voters were friendly to La Follette and progressive. The 
conservative Fargo Forum--wishfully perhaps--had predicted that 
there would be little likelihood of any trouble from that quarter, 
as there had been in other states, because the North Dakota elector,s 
87 Wahpeton Globe-Gazette, Sept. 12, 1912; Bismarck Tribune, 
Octo 9, 1912; Fargo Forum, Sept. 30, 1912. 
88 Fargo Courier-News, Oct. 3, 1912. 
89 Ibid., Oct. 8, 1912. 
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were real La Follette progressives who would not support Roosevelt 
at any pri~e.90 However, such was not the case. On August 14, H. 
H. Aaker, one of the electors resigned. He asserted that, since 
he could not vote for either Wilson, or Taf't, he would join the 
Progressive Party. On August 25, Gilbert Johnson of Mohall re-
signed as an elector. Johnson repudiated the 11 whole reactionary 
program of the Republican party as expressed in the Chicago 6on-
i 
vention. 11 He endorsed Colonel Roosevelt, and Joined the Progressivte 
I 
Party.91 And on August 31, D. P. Barnes of Glen Ullin declared he 
would not support Taft, and resigned as a presidential elector of 
the Republican Party.92 Finally, by election time, only F. w. 
Cathro, a faithful Taft man, was left of the original presidential 1 
electors.93 We see, then, that most of' the men who were elected as! 
I 
progressive Republican electors would rather leave their party than 
i 
support Taft. Yet the progressive Republican bolt to the Pro-
gressive Party was by no means complete; Senator A. J. Gronna for 
example, announced that he would stand by the national party nomine~, 
I 
and that if he were to line up with the Bull Moosers he would feel 
, it his duty to resign his Senatorship. In deed, although Gronna 
90 Fargo Forum, July 23, 1912. 
91 Fargo Courier-J:fews, August 25, 1912. 
92 Ibid., August 31, 1912. 
93 Ibid., August 26, 1912. 
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had not favored Taft's nomination, he declared that he would come 
to the state to work for Taft and the Republican ticket.94 It 
, was a course which no doubt many other progressives in North Dakota. 
were to follow. 
An important aspect of the gubernatorial campaign was the 
attitude of the state newspapers. In a state wiae canvass of the 
publications of North Dakota,- the stalwart Fargo Forum found that 
ttor the 340 papers pUblished ••• 226 are advocating the election 
1 of L.B. Hanna and the Republican ticket all the way down the 
i 
1 line.n Thirty-three of the state's newspapers were for the third 
·party; nineteen supported the straight Democratic ticket, while 
sixty-two weekly papers,,most of which 'lftre normally Republican, 
had not indicated where they stood. Some of the papers credited 
with supporting the third party were put in that category because 
they were supporting Roosevelt.95 The Valley City Times-Record 
claimed that fully ninety per cent of the daily and weekly news-
papers proposed to support the fu.11 Republican state ticket, from 
Hanna on down. It,also announced that such papers as~ Progressive 
Observer of Grand Forks, The Bismarck Times, and others which had 
supported Buchanan in the primaries, were supporting Hanna for 
tovernor.96 Actually, few papers supported the Progressive 1arty. 
94 Steele Ozone; Mohall News, quoted from the Fargo Forum, 
Aug. 19, 1912 • 
95 •Fargo Forum, Oct. 4, 1912. 
96 Valley City Times-Record, quoted from the Fargo Forum, 
Oct. 3, 1912 • 
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The Fargo Courier-News was the Progressive'a main organ. Never-
theless, despite divided sentiments of North Dakota Progressives 
and a hostile press, the Progressives nominated Martin Jacobson of: 
Minot as their candidate for the office of Commissioner of Agri-
culture and Labor on September 25. This office was the only one, 
except the office of Governor, for which the Progressives put up 
a candidate against the regularly elected nominees of the Re-
publican Party; no candidates were put up against the nominees for· 
the Congressional seats. The nomination of Jacobson was made by 
the state central committee of the Progressive Party. Jacobson was 
a progressive Republican, and while he was never a candidate be-
97 fore, he had held positions of responsibility as an appointee. 
Jacobson was a longtime resident from Minot; his nomination was a 
good one, stated the Carrington Record, but there was little reason 
to think that he would defeat his opponent, W. c. Gilbreath.98 
Gilbreath was from Mandan and had held the office of Commissioner 
of Agriculture and Labor for four terms. In fact it was primarily [ 
because he had held this office since 1906, and was therefore 
allegedly lined up with the stalwarts that a candidate was put up 
against him. 
Before describing the actual Progressive campaign, it might 
be well to discuss the issues which were to play the most important! 
• ! 
part in the North Dakota campaign. The first was that of the tari:fr 
97 Fargo Courier-News, Sept. 26, 1912. 
· 98 Carrington Record, quoted from the Fargo Forum, Oct. 9, 
1912. 
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and the inconsistent stand the factions took on the question. As 
far as North Dakota was concerned, the ma.in question was reciproci-: 
ty. Earlier, as has been pointed out, President Taft backed a 
1 reciprocity tariff with Canada which eventually was enacted into 
1 law. The reciprocity bill had been the center of much debate in 
North Dakota. The progressives, as well as the stalwarts, had 
been against it. Senator Porter J. McCumber, Congressman H. T. 
Helgesen, and Senator A. J. Gronna all actively had opposed the 
measure in Congress, and McCumber had actually led the opposition, 
99 working with the Senators of, other big grain producing states. 
Although the excitement created by the bill's passage in 1911 
should have died down, the election of 1912 found it assuming large 
proportions in North Dakota. Before the presidential primary the 
'McVille Journal (prog-Rep) had pointed out that the Fargo Courier-
~' then a Democratic daily, supported the Taft Reciprocity bill 
and had attacked Senator McCumber for opposing it. Then, the 
Journal stated, before the presidential primary, the Courier-News 
attempted to bring back the supposedly dead issue to scare the 
farmers to vote agains~ Roosevelt because he at one time declared 
100 
himself for the general principle of reciprocity. Furthermore, 
the McVille publication declared that Roosevelt had never actually 
99 Alfred M. Herwig, "The Farmer and Canadian-American 
Reciprocity, 1911", (unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of 
Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1943), 207-9. 
100 
McVille Journal, March 7, 1912. 
declared himself as favoring the reciprocity 'treaty with Canada. 
Roosevelt, the Journal believed, knew the farmers too well to dis-
101 · criminate against them. Mowry, however, states that he had 
102 
praised the treaty and called it "admirable from every standpoint. 11: 
i 
Realizing the scope of the issue after Roosevelt became the 
presidential candidate of a third party, the stalwarts immediately i 
tried to prove that the Colonel was behind the reciprocity pact 
from the beginning. The anti-Roosevelt Fargo Forum revealed that 
when North Dakotans were making their fight against reciprocity 
they got no enco·uragement from Roosevelt. When the Colonel :passed , 
through Fargo when the agitation was at its height, a delegation 
had accompanied him to Minneapolis but could get no satisfaction 
from rum. The Forum noted that now since the attacks on the reci-
procity measure, the Colonel had started to come out against this 
tnade policy, and that wherever the farmers oppose the policy, the 
103 
Rough Rider condemned the measure. In a letter from Roosevelt 
to Taft, dated January 12, 1911, Roosevelt had said: 
I firmly believe in free trade with Canada for both 
economic and political reasons •••• Whether 
Canada will accept such reciprocity I do not know, 
but it is greatly to our credit to make the effort. 
It may damage the Republican party for a while but 
it will surely benefit the party in the end •••• 
Later the F~rum did admit, however, that a few months later at 
the Minnesota state fair, Roosevelt had said: "The Canadian Reei- i 
proeity Act was a jug-handled arrangement under which the farmers 
101 McVille Journal, Feb. 29, 1912. 






While the regular Republicans attempted to ally Theodore 
Roosevelt with the Canadian Reciprocity measure, they, at the same 
time, attempted to explain away the part Taft played in the affair. 
On July 23, after Taft had indicated to several western Senators 
' who were opponents of the reciprocity measure that he would favor 
the repeal of the act, the Bismarck Tribune predicted its repeal 
105 
in the near future. One month later, the Fargo For-Qm-eaught 
in inconsistency, too-clarified 'I.ts view as to the reciprocity 
question. It stated that, although it had opposed reciprocity with 
Canada, it could now see the benefits that it was sure Taft had in, 
mind for the country-if the Reciprocity treaty were passed and that 
it now realized that Taft was looking out for the interests of the 
nation as a whole, and not just the interests of a few farmers in 
Northwest. The Forum went on to declare that Taft should not be 
condemned in the state for his one mistake. Although the Fargo 
publication proeiaimed that there were hundreds of lifelong Rep-
ublicans in North Dakota who would never vote for him because of 
his reciprocity views, the Forum believed that his progressive recotd 
106 
in the White House would be to his great favor. Even Senator 
MeCumber, the man who lad the fight against the measure, was of the: 
same view. He stated: 
l04 Fargo Forum, Sept. 20, 1912. 
105 
Bismarck Tribune, July 23, 1912. 
106 Fargo Forum, August 28, 1921. 
, I 
I have found the really only main objection to the 
President among the North Dakota voters has been 
based on his reciprocity treaty. Canadian reci-
procity, while an objectionable feature to the people 
of this state, was on the whole something the majority 
of the people of the country wanted. The President 
thought he was acting in the interests of the majority 
of the people of the United States, so that his error, 
if error it really was, was one of judgement rather 
than one of heart; 
And now the President has repudiated reciprocity 
and is standing on a platform that expresses itself 
definitely against reeiproeity.107 
So definite was the feeling against reciprocity that during the 
electoral campaign the North Dakota Republican state committee 
took a strong stand on the subject. It stated: 
We demand the immediate repeal of the iniquitous Canadian 
reciprocity aet, which adopts democratic free trade in 
farm products and thus unjustly discriminates against 
the farmer. 108 
Another factor which was included in,the tariff issue was the1 
proposed tariff commission which Roosevelt advocated in his plat-
form. This commission was to be used to do away with the old form 
of congressional tariff revisimn which was inadequate and produced, 
injustice and special privilege. A commission of experts would 
investigate the whole tariff picture, and they would rearrange 
the schedules and adjust duties to the needs of capital, of labor, 
109 
and of the consumer. However, the conservatives did not see 
107 Fargo Rorum, Oct. 26, 1912. 
108 Ibid., Oct. 2, 1912. 
109 Bismarck Tribune, Oct. 18, 1912. 
that this would be a scientific sort of procedure. Instead they 
sa~ an attempt by Roosevelt to reduce Congress to nothing and to 
increase the latitude of the President. Under the commission 
scheme, the Bismarck Tribune maintained, Roosevelt could appoint 
a commission nheaded by George w. Perkins, for the regulation of 
trusts; another commission appointed by himself for regulating 
the tariff; and with still another commission headed by Giff'ord 
Pinchot, f'or fixing and executing a policy for conservationi.11110 
Thus, the Tribune believed, Roosevelt would be ''the complete 
master of the situa.tion.n Roosevelt supporters did little more 
than deny these charges and accusations. 
The other leading issue of the campaign was where the 
candidates stood on the trusts. Newspapers representing the three 
parties each accused the other candidates of being backed by the 
big capitalists. The Progressives accused Taft of being sold out 
to the 'interests', and his trust prosecutions as being very I!J.1~ch 
of a joke. The Fargo Courier-~ revealed that the oil trust, 
which was supposed to have been put out of business by the Taft 
administration, saw its stocks go up to unprecedented figures. 
The Courier-News added that the beef trust, which was supposed to 
be dissolved as a result of a nine-year long lawsuit, advanced 
its prices to a point where many consumers could not buy its 
products. The Progressives, stated the Fargo publication, wanted 
110 
Bismarck Tribune, Oct. 18, 1912. 
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trusts were a natural development of business, they were only out-
done by Eugene V. Debs and Victor Berger, the Socialists, who 
wanted the goverl3lllent to go a little further and take the· trusts 
over. Therefore, the Daily Journal stated, the Bull Moosers and 
the Socialists 11 seem about ready to lie dovm together. nll3 The 
Republican Fargo Forum and Powers Lake~ also declaaed that 
Roosevelt was backed by the capitalists. 114 Congressman James B. 
Aswell of Louisiana spoke in Fargo on October 7, censuring the 
third party nominee and his 'trust' alliance. The Congressman 
stated, however, that Roosevelt would have liked "to get away from 
the odium of the Perkins rumor if he could but that the latter's 
money was necessary to keep his ca...mpaign alive and make it possibJe 
for him to run for president, so the Colonel had to put up with 
Perkins' Pork barrel. nll5 Thus, it can be seen that both parties, 
the Democrats and the Republicans, demonstrated which candidate 




It is interesting to note that while the electoral campaign w-a~ 
in full swing, George W. Perkins was reported to be coming to Nortli 
i 
Dakota as an agent of the International Harvester Company. The 
I 
I 
purpose of his visit, it was stated, was to establish a closer re-
1 
I 
lation between the farmer and the manufacturer of farming machiner~. 
The Devils Lake Journal declared that Perkins had long contended 
that the manufacturer and the farmers should be allies, and that 
they should have a cooperative relationship which would be to 
the 
ll3 Devila Lake Journal, Oct. 2, 1912. 
114 Fargo Forum, Oct. 8, 1912; 
Fargo Forum, August 31, 1912. 
115 . .. .. - - . .... . -- --'"' 
Fargo Forum, Oct. 8, 191c. 
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by political strife they will declare that the greatest 
thing he ever did was to assume the responsibilities 
of the leadership of the new party. They will declare 
this the greatest fight ever made for the people.119 
Dixon went on to say that, among the many other progressive 
measures, Roosevelt favored recall of the President. He also 
predicted Roosevelt's success in November. 
Following Senator Dixon into North Dakota was the ex-chief 
forester Gifford Pinchot who had made a tour through the state 
before the presidential primaries. While speaking in Fargo on 
October 4, Pinchot was accompanied on the platform by Mayor Sweet, 
Progressive candidate for governer, and Captain E. E. Barclay of 
Texas who was sent to North Dakota by the National Sepakers Bureau,' 
an agency of the Progressive National ~ommittee. Speaking to a 
full house, Pinchot retold the reasons for Roosevelt's running for: 
re-election. He discussed the break with La Follette, ~nd of course, 
he blamed it on the Wisconsin Senator. Two different views con-
cerning the reception of the speeches were found in the rival 
Fargo papers. The Forum stated that it was quite evident the 
people of North Dakota had not forgotten their preference for La-
Follette by the manner in which they acted when the former chief-
forester denounced him. It stated that from Pinchot's first 
1 derogatory comment to the end of his address, many La Follette 
admirers in the audience were walking out of the meeting place. 
119 




Even the mention of Wilson's name was said to have elieited consider-
; 
120 
able applause. On the other hand the ~urier-News declared that i 
after Mayor Sweet spoke on the social Justice features of the Pro-
gressive platform, and after Captain Barclay discussed the evils 
of the older parties, the audience showed, by its applause, that 
121 
it was with Sweet in this fight. 
The Bull Moose campaign had begun, and Mayor Sweet made his 
182 
first campaign speech in Devils Lake to a very fair sized audience.: 
Siver Serumgard, who had played a conspicuous part in the drawing 
of the Progressive platform in Chicago, presided at the meeting and 
introduced the speakers. After Sweet expounded the cause of the 
Bull Moose, Judge Noah Allen of Texas, who had been a Taf't appoint8ie 
that was asked to resign after Texas sent a Roosevelt delsation ~o 
123 
Chicago, told how the Texas delegation was stolen. Allen 
accompanied Sweet throughout the state through most of the campaign 
in the interests of the national end of the ticket. 
Sweet I s first campaign tou.r -took him across the northern part i 
of the state, from Grand Forks to DeviJfs Lake, Minot and Williston.I 
I 
In Minot Sweet spoke to a good sized audience about the fUt1li ty of'! 
120 Fargo Forum, Oct. 5, 1912. 
121 Fargo Courier-News, Oct. 6, 1912. 
122 Devils Lake Journal, Sept. 18, 1912. 
123 Ibid. 
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electing either of the Democratic or Republican candidates be-
cause they were not progressive, and because it would be a step 
124 
backwards. Both frdeet and Allen spoke again in Williston. The 
meeting in Williston has been described as follows by a hostile 
critic: 
By hard riding and skillful use of the lariat, about 
a dozen mavericks were secured, for we were informed 
on creditable authority there were sixty-three p.el"sons 
in attendance about fifty of whom were Democrats &nd 
Socialists while of the balance, it was a little 
difficult to determine the ownership owing to the 
absence of proper brands. However it was evident from 
the occasional feeble hand claps that a few calves had 
broken away from the Republican camp and had been 
corraIIed by the Moosemen. Whether or not they succeeded 
in affixing any permanent brands is doubtful •••• 125 
At RCllgby the local paper declared that Judge Allen failed to 
arouse much enthusiasm for Teddy, and that Allen condemned the old: 
parties as rotten and corrupt which the newspaper said was not 
very favorable to Allen hi~self because only a few weeks before 
he had himself been a member in good standing of that old, rotten 
126 
Republican Party. The Optimist stated Allen must have learned 
a lQt along that line in that short space of time, and that had a 
socialist sprung that information on the Judge six or eight months 
127 
ago, he would have turned up his nose at him. On se,tember 26, 
Sweet and Allen arrived in Bismarck for their scheduled meeting 
124 Minot Daily Renorter, Sept. 19, 1912. 
125 Williston Graphic, Sept. 26, 1912. The Graphic further 
stated that the Bull Moosers stole the Socialist platform. 











and speeches. The Bismarck Tribune reported that the meeting 
t•r1attened out like a pancake and evaporated or rather failed to 
128 
materialize. 0 Why the meeting failed is not known; the Tribune 
stated that it had been announced in its columns the day before. 
This staunch Republican paper claimed that this was a fair sample 
"of conditions over the entire state, and that there was no sympathYj 
. ~9 
in North Dakota for 11 the disgruntled politican. 11 At Jamestmm. 
less than 100 people attended the Ppogressive meeting, and it was . 
130 i 
said that there was little interest shown in that locality. How-' 
ever, at Hettinger, a large crowd turned out to hear how the 
131 
campaign issues would be discussed. Accompanied by Dr. Greegan, 
Sweet visited Hope, and was greeted by only about 100 people. 
The people of Hope, according to Hope Pioneer (R), were not impress-
ed by either of the Progressives. This publication stated: "We 
1)2 
feel safe in saying Mayor Sweet lo st votes on his visit to Hope. u · 
The Pioneer also reported that Creegan conf'ined most of his talk 
to re;euting the reports (which the paper stated had hardly been 
heard in Hope) that Roosevelt was a great consumer of intoxicating 
liquor. Because Creegan took the time to answer these charges, 
they must have been circulating, probably in the form of a rumor 
128 Bismarck Tribune, Sept. 27, 1912. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Fargo Forum, Sept. 27, 1912. 
131 Adams County Record, Oct. 17, 1912. 
132 Hope Pioneer, quoted from the Fargo Forum, Oct. 24, 1912. 
Out of this election campaign, Roosevelt brought suit against an 
editor who accused him of being a drunkard. Pringle, Roosevelt 573-······-·····----··-· -·----·------ -·-·------------------ -·---- --··--·-·· .. . .. . . . -·- ·-·· I·----- .. -·-··- . 
because such accusations might have influenced the vote 
somewhat in 11 d.ry 11 North Dakota. 
Meanwhile the papers favoring the Progressive Party were 
putting out another version of the campaign. The Fargo Courier-
~ stated that reports from the localities in which Mayor Sweet 
had visited were of the most encouraging character. The Courier-
News reported assurances of support from unexpected sources con-
tinued to come to the Fargo Mayor from all se.iltons of the state, 
even on the Missouri slope where Hanna was supposed to be the 
133 
strongest. One policy that did draw considerable attention to 
the Progressive nominee for governor was his "dividend" theory, 
which had attracted nation-wide attention ,or Fargo. This was a 
plan he originated whereby from a large fund collected by the city 
of Fargo from licenses, circuses, and so on, there was to be a 
dividend declared and the surplus refunded back to the taxpayers. 
Sweet held that if the money were allowed to remain in the treasury' 
it would accumulate until it became so alluring to the members of 
the city council ''that they would not be satisfied until they spent 
I it for some purpose, such as a junketing trip some place or even 
in the erection of a steeple on the city hall. 11134 Once, while 
speaking in Minot, the Fargo Mayor was handed a telegram from the 
l33 Fargo Courier-News, Sept. 21, 1912; Oct. 7, 1912. 
134 
Minot Daily Reporter, Sept. 19, 1912; Devils Lake Journal,!_ 
Sept. lti, 1912. · 
New York American Lsi_g/ a leading daily owned by William Randolph 
Hearst, requesting him for five h~ndred words on hie plan for 
135 
declaring a tax dividend. At nearly every meeting that Mayor 
Sweet spoke, he was asked to explain and tell about his tax-dividend 
scheme. It, perhaps, caused more interest than the speeches given\ 
about the evils of the old parties. 
In the opinion of the writer the state campaign appeared to 
fall flat. It seems that Hanna did not campaign very extensively 
for the governorship. In none of the papers used by the writer 
was there any mention of Hanna's speeches or campaign acitvity. 
This seems to indicate that Hanna conducted a quiet campaign and 
that actually in spite of all what might at first ap9ear to have 
been the case, little bitterness was created between the elements 
of the Republican Party. On the other hand, it was found that 
Sweet campaigned extensively, but, because of the lack of local 
issues, he spent his time discussing the National Progressive 
platform and his tax-dividend plan. Besides Dr. Creegan and H. R. 
Tucker, a Fargo attorney, few others were stumping the state in 
support of the state Progressive candidates. 
i 
The final feature of the -,Jrogressive campaign was the appearanpe 
of the noted Hull House leader and reformer, Jane Addams on October 
28. Speaking before the largest crowd ever congregated in Fargo 
to hear a woman speak, reported the Fargo Republican press, Miss 
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Grand Old Party. 11A good licking was the thing needed by the part} 
of Lincoln to bring it back to the standard. to which it then held," 
140 . 
stated the Democratic Governor. Once again, we find the Democrats 
courting the progressive Republicans to break away from their 
party. 
On October 4, ano~her factor entered the North Dakota scene 
when word came from Senator Robert M. La Follette that he would 
tour the state during the electoral battle, and campaign against 
the Bull Moose nominee. La Follette stated: 
I will certainly have something to say about Colonel 
Roosevelt and his Wall street friends who are trying 
to ditch the real progressive movement. I charge 
Roosevelt with trying to kill the progressive move-
ment. Big b..1.siness operating through George W. 
Perkins, had grown desperate at the great progressive 
development of the original progressives and took up 
Roosevelt in order to kill this republican progressive 
menace to their control and at the same time to get 
through the Gary-Carnigie-Morgan plan of government 
recognition of the trusts and their water.141 
la Follette did not say who he would campaign for; he only said 
he would work against Roosevelt. 
The interests of Roosevelt again were attacked when the great• 
Democrat William Jennings Bryan entered North Dakota. Speaking 
from a platform on which there were eighteen women, all members 
of the Wilson Club of Fargo, Bryan attacked Roosevelt and his 
supporters. "Roosevelt entered the progressive vinya(~ 11:45 
o'clock," declared the "great comrnoneru to the largest audience 
140 Fargo Courier-News, Sept. 24, 1912. 
141 Fargo Forum, Oct. 4, 1912. 
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Gilpatrick hotel in Milwaukee on his way to deliver an address 
at the auditorium. The man who shot him was diser1bed as "a 
maniac" who claimed Roosevelt was a menace as a third-termer. 145 
1 The Progressive Fargo Courier-~ had a big spread on its front 
1 page concerning the incident. It reported that the Milwaukee 
police had to hold back a crowd that wanted to lynch the man who 
shot the Colonel, a riot nearly resulted. It had been only the 
pleadings of Roosevelt that stopped the crowd. The Courier-News 
declared that hundreds of Roosevelt admirers kept the wires hot 
regarding the news of the Colonel's shooting. Long distance calls 
from all over the state were reported to have been received by the 
Courier-News, which as fast they were received, published bulletins 
which were in the local hotels and were thrown on the screen at a 
local theatre. In typical Roosevelt fashion, the Colonel declared 
he would "make his speech or die, 11 and he was rushed to the :c: 
146 
Milwaukee auditorium where an anxious crowd awaited him. Although 
, he was warned by physicians of his danger, declared the Courier-
News, he refused to quit and made a long address, ''weakening as he i 
147 
1 completed his message. n The wound, however, was not serious, but 
Roosevelt was put off his feet for about two weeks. While Roosevelt 
was in the hospital, the Courier-News had a small article each day 
145 Fargo Forum, Oct. 15, 1912. 
146 Fargo Courier-News, Oct. 15, 1912. 
147 Ibid 0 A manuscript of Roosevelt's speech in his pocket 
deflected the course of the bullet and probably prevented the 
murder of the Progressive candidate for President. 
156 
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on., the condition of Roosevelt, giving his temperature, blood pres 
heart beat, and respiration count. Meanwhile, John Shrank made 
his will in prison. He told a fellow prisoner that one provision 
of his last testament was that the bullet in Roosevelt was to be 
given to ~ne New York Historical Society as a reminder of all 
148 
nthird term aspirants.u 
After the attempted ass~ination, both sides redueed their 
149 
campaign activity. Woodrow Wilson declined to make anymore fight. 
The Fargo Courier-News pointed to the attempt to assasinate Roose- 1 
1 velt and declared that that act was ''the climax of the most v1.tupep.: 
ative campaign ever waged against the good name and character of 
an American citizen." Because of the abuse and defamation which 
was showered on Roosevelt by the hostile press and by his political, 
opponents, making Roosevelt appear as "a dangerous, unscrupulous 
seeker of power11 , the weak minded person who shot Roosevelt was 
driven to that action. Therefore, the attacks on Roosevelt by his 
150 
opponents were almost the eause of his death. On the other hand, 
the.Republican Fargo Forum stated that some Roosevelt followers 
were attempting to make capital out of the murderous assault upon 
the Colonel. The Forum stated that some Roosevelt supporters were 
boasting that his shooting was worth many votes, feeling that the 
people would be sympathetic and would forget the principles 
148 Fargo Courier-News, Oct. 18, 1912. 
149 Link, 517. 
150 Fargo Courier-News, Oct. 15, 1912. 
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Hanna more than he would harm him. His candidacy, it claimed, 
154 
only assured Hanna of election. The paper quoted the following 
as what it believed expressed the situation in North Dakota better 
than anything else: 
••• As Colonel Roosevelt passes across a state making 
rapid-fire explosive speeches, a wave of surface enthusiasm 
accompanies him. As he goes on to other fields it subsides 
and moves but sluggishly, giving marked signs of inherent 
weaknesso It is becoming increasingly evident that the 
third party is not deep rooted in its convictions. Power-
ful, magnetic, and vote drawing as he is, even Roosevelt 
grows very thin when spread over the United States. 
There is not enough of him to go around. 155 
Leading political .figures also expressed their predictions 
about the election's outcome in North Dakota. Robert M. La Follet~e, 
on the day before the election, sent a message to the Republican 
state committee. He stated that no North Dako)a progressive could 
afford to support the Roosevelt ,arty. The Wisconsin senator was 
sure that the progressive leadership 1n·the Republican ~arty would; 
156 
hold together and defeat Roosevelt. North Dakota's ~epublican 
National Committeeman Thomas F; Marshall stated that he believed 
the campaign, which had been marked by uncertainty and indecision 
on the part of the people to be noncommittal, was a 11 thinking 
campaign." He believed that the Progressive Party was negligible; 
154 Fargo Forum, Nov. 2, 1912. 
155 Ibid., Sept. 28, 1912. 
156 I Ibid., Nov. 4, 1912. It had been La Follette s intention 
to tour North Dakota, but the situation in his own state needed 
his attention more than the outside situation. He was compelled 
to abandon his c·)ntemplated trip through the Dakotas, Frl.nnesota, 
and Nebraska. 
"of those who think of voting for Roosevelt, not 10 per cent are 
157 
third party men.'' · He said that most of them had been Republicanf) 
' 
and predicted that they would remain Republicans after the Novembe~ 
election. The chairman of the Democratic state central committee, I 
D. H. McArthur had the same view; he said he could see little 
Roosevelt sentiment in North Dakota, and that he was worrying more• 
158 
about Taft than he was about Roosevelt. Per~ps he was one of 
the few that felt that way. However, George Fi.Authier, political. 
editor of the Minneapolis Tribune, under a Bismarck dateline of 
October 11, stated: 
••• The present situation would point to these 
three conclusions. Wilson is in the lead in the 
presidential race; Roosevelt's strength in un-
certain, but considerable; Taft is possibly third 
in the race, but his strength is constantly growing • 
• • • The nomination of the third party ticket with 
Mayor Sweet of Fargo as the candidate for governor, 
has apparently hurt the colonel as it had done in other 
states. 159 
Meanwhile, leaders in the Progressive Party were claiming the 
state for Roosevelt and Johnson. Judge Noah Allen of Texas declar-
ed Roosevelt would be first, whereas Taft would be a poor third 
160 
with the possibility of Debs winning that position. The Fargo 
157 Fargo Forum, Oct. 31, 1912. 
158 ~., Sept. 21, 1912. 
159 ~., Oct. 12, 1912. 
160 M:tnot Daily Reporter, Sept. 13, 1912. 
160 
Cdurier-News predicted a complete victory for the Progressive,. 
Mayor sweet, it declared, would be able to enter office unhampered 
by any old ties that bind the stalwart candidate. Sweet, it 
161 
pointed out, had no McKenzie gang affilations behind him. Iti: 
was stated that Teddy would sweep the "slopen and the whole state 
would go to him. 
Finally, in the last weeks of the campaign a series of 
accusations and denials were made by elements of all the parties. 
First, the Republicans charged the Democratic gubernatorial 
candidate, Warden F. o. Hellstrom, with closing down the twine 
' 
plant in the state penitentiary when the farmers of the state need-4 
I 
' ' ed the twine to harvest their crops. They charged that the farmer~ 
were denied the use of a plant which thetr taxes maintained. The 
twine shortage in North Dakota was caused by the warden's lack of 
foresight, and by his belief that distribution of campaign liter-
162 
ature was more important than twine, it was stated. Ward.en 
Hellstrom answered the accusations by denouncing the papers that 
made them, claiming that these charges were inspired by the Inter-
national Harvester Company. While Hellstrom condemned Hanna and 
161 Fargo Courier-News, Oct. 26, 1912; Oct. 30, 1912; Nov. 5, 
1912. 
162 Bismarck Tribune, Oct. 23, 1912; the Fargo Forum and the· 
McIntosh County Republican also made these charges. 
' I 
161 
the Republicans, he praised Mayor Sweet, his other opponent. 
Hellstrom even urged the support of Sweet. This brought about 
the charge by the Fargo Fcn•um that with Hellstrom urging the 
people to vote for Sweet, he was attempting to cut down Hanna's 
plurality, and make his own chances for election greater. The 
Forum declared, "a vote for sweet is a vote for Hellstrom. n·l63 
In turn the Progressives charged Congressman Hanna with the mis-
use of his Congressional frank privilege. They declared Hanna had 
used his mailing right for personal political literature, even 
after being warned against doing so by Postmaster-General Hitch-
cock. The Progressives declared Hanna had cheated the people out 
164 
of #18,750 in postage and stationery. These accusations were 
all denied, of course, and they appeared to be a little more than 
a last minute attempt to sway the undecided voter. 
Such was the political picture when electimn day, November 5, 
came to North Dakota. The final vote was not as great as the 
vote in the preceding elections of 1908 and 1910, but it was great-1 
(:'',·· 
er than either the presidential preferential primary and the 
general primary of 19120 Woodrow Wilson won the state's electoral 
165 
vote with approximately 29,555 votes. Theodore Roosevelt was 
163 Fargo Forum, Nov. 2, 1912. 
164 Fargo Courier-News, Oct. 26, 1912. 
l65 State of North Dakota 1913 Le5islat1ve Manual 263. These 
and all the other figures concerning the presidential candidates 
are approximate. They were obtained by the selection of the high-
est number of votes either of that candidate's electors received. 
The electors'votes varied; each had a different total. 
162 
second with 25,726; Taft was third with 23,090; and Eugene v. 
Debs was fourth with a total of 6,966 votes. The Prohibitionist 
candidate received 1,243 votes. All of the Republican candidates 
166 
for Congress were elected with large majorities. In the guber-
natorial contest, L. B. P...anna won the election. He had 39,811 
votes, while F. o. Hellstrom had 31,544, and w. D. Sweet reeeived 
9,406. The Socialist candidate A. E. Bowen Jr., received 6,835 
votes. The Republica~s swept the rest of the state ticket handily. 
In the only other office which the Progressive Party contested, 
w. c. Gilbreath, the Republican candidate, received a great majorit~ 
over the Progressive candidate, Martin Jacobson, with his total 
of 43,488 to 6,238 votes cast for Jacobson. Even the Socialist 
candidate, H. E. Thogipson, received more votes than the Progressive 
candidate received; he got 7.,204 votes. The Democrats were second 1 
167 
in all the state offices. The Republican Party had won back con-
trol of the state offices of North Dakota. 
166 They were H. T. Helgesen, George M. Young, and P. D. Nor-
ton, all progressive Republicans. 
167 
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The election of 1912 put Wilson in the '!flh1 te House and gave 
the Democrats control over bath the Senate and the House of Rep-
resentatives. It was the first time in eighteen years that they 
had full charge of the government. They were victorious also in 
twenty-one of the state gubernatorial contests. The election 
seemed indeed, to be a complete repudiation of the old order. The 
Democratic Party which had been "counted down and out by some of 
the most astute and experienced analysts in the country had come 
back with one of the most complete victories in history, leaving 
the opposition, so long dominant in the -country, more hopelessly 
split and more deeply depressed than the Democrats had been at 
any time except immediately following the Civil War. 111 Although 
Wilson polled only forty-two per cent of the vote, he won an over-
whelming victory in the electoral college; Roosevelt, with twenty-
seven per cent of the vote, carried only six states; and Taft with 
twenty-three per cent, only two, Utah and Vermont. The progressive; 
( 
principles which Wilson, Roosevelt, and Debs espoused had commande~ 
the support of over three-fourths of the voters. 2 Furthermore, 
j 
/ 
the results of the primaries showed that even within the Republican] 
1 Kent, 406. 











seve was an r 
168 
i,ut up a strong candidate against the progressive La Follette. 
Taft would not do because he was pointed to as the conservative 
leader as well as the 1%:n,menter of all the reciprocity troubles 
in North Dakota. Therefore, he would have little voting power 
in this state. A strong candidate was found in Roosevelt, who, 
when judged by some of associates, appeared to be~ good risk 
for the stalwarts. The charge that on the national scene many 
leading stalwarts were backing Rooseve~t only to beat La Folle_tte 
and his progressivism is borne out in the North Dakota preferential 
primary. The action of the progressive delegates at the National 
convention ~urther shows the strength of the progressive element 
in North Dakota. The delegates a~ayed with La. Follette, the 
recognized leader of progressivism, despite the efforts of some 
members of the delegation to deliver their delegate's votes to. 
Roosevelt. Meanwhile, the power of the progressives on state 
issues, already well a~teated by the three victories of the Demo-
crat John Burke-1906, 1908, and:_19;9, was f'urther demonstrated in 
the primary when the progressives had selected their candidates 
for Congress and every state office except that of Governor. L. 
B.i: Hanna, with a clean record and only :recently having supported 
Roosevelt, won the gubernatorial nomination by 1,086 votes. He 
received 24,515 out of the 57,503 first choice votes; he obtained 
only 4,063 out of the 16,835 second choice votes.4 Perhpps the 
4 State of North Dakota 1913 Legislative Manual, 234-242. 

candidates for Governor and for Commissioner of Agriculture and 
Labor is proof of this: whereas Roosevelt ran second for Pres-.. 
ident, receiving 25,726 votes or approximately 30 per cent of the1~· 
vote cast for that office, Mayor Sweet, his gubernatorial running 
mate, obtained only 9,406 out of the 87,586 votes cast for Governor, 
or almost 11 per cent of the vote; and Martin Jacobson, Progressive 
candidate for Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor did even worse~ 
getting only 6,238 of the 80,045 votes cast for that office, or 
5 ' 
less than 8 per cent. On the other hand, one thing that the Pro-i 
gressive Party did accomplish was that it stopped the old trend 
of the progressives voting for the Democrat to beat the stalwart 
candidate for Governor. The progressive vote given Sweet would 
have elected Hellstrom, the Democrat, to the governorship. Furthep 
more, because the leading progressives and progressives with state 
Republican endorsements favored Hanna, he received enough votes 
to win the fall election. 
Roosevelt's defeat in North Dakota can be attributed to many 
reasons. Few North Dakota progressives liked the men behind the 
Rough Rider. In the primaries they voted asainst the state stalwa~t 
faction, but in November they voted against Roosevelt's financial 
backers represented by George Perkins of the much-hated Harvester 
Trust. Many of the progressives felt that Roosevelt had 1 double-
crossed1 La Follette, the man regarded by North Dakota progressives[ 
as the father of the progressive movement. Finally, and possibly 
of the greatest importance, the third party demanded by Roosevelt 
5 State of North Dakota 1913 Legislative Manual, 262-271. 
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' was not what the progressives wanted. This party was mismanaged 
and wa.s contrary to the tenets of the North Dakota progressives who; 
did not want to leave the Republican Party, but wanted to reform 
the party from within. The Non-Partisan League's formation in 1915! 
I 




In conclusion Roosevelt sincerely sought a new party, contrary1 
to the charge that he had formed one only so that he could be 
nominated for the Presidency. The Rough Rider wanted a party from 
the state level on up; he had to oppose men in many states that 
polit;cally he should have left alone. Nevertheless, he insisted 
on &!state ticket, and he even came to North Dakota to help pick 
1 
it. The Colonel worked hard :tbra strong party but it was to no 
avail in North Dakota. Because of the dissen~ion and mismanagement 
found within the party itself, the party's strength was sapped and 
undermined. Roosevelt was the whole party in North Dakota, but he 
could not do all the work alone. The reason for the failure of the. 
North Dakota Progressive Party by 1916, which might well bathe 
, reason for its failure nationally, was that it had no local roots. 
It was imposed. from the top down; there was little or no demand for 
~ 6 The writer differs in opinion some~t with the information 
of well known politicians obtained for this brief history. They 
believe that the Progressive Party played no part in the forma,tion 
of the Non-Partisan League, and that it left nno descendants to 
posterity." Personal interview with Mr. o. B. Burtness, 412 Reeves 
Drive, Grand Forks, North Dakota, January 19, 1950; Personal letter 
from Representative Usher L. Burdick of North Dakota, dated Feb-
ruary 16, 1950; Personal letter from Representative William Lamke 
of North Dakota, dated February 22, 1950. 
I 
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